Lectures

The information contained in these lecture notes was compiled by the course TAs in 2017 and 2018, including Takehiro Oyakawa, Gianluca Pane, Gabe Bankman-Fried, and Enrique Areyan-Viqueira. They based these notes in large part on the lecture notes and accompanying videos of Tim Roughgarden's CS 364A and CS 364B courses at Stanford, and Jason Hartline's Mechanism Design and Approximation textbook.

Lecture Topic Readings
0 Welcome
Algorithmic Game Theory Applications
Guidelines for Class Participation
1 Introduction to Game Theory
Normal-Form Games
Battle of the Sexes
ICA: Beauty Contest

Essentials of Game Theory: Chapters 1 & 2 by Kevin Leyton-Brown and Yoav Shoham
Rock, Paper, Scissors (The Simpsons)
The Prisoners' Dilemma (Dilbert)
2 Introduction to Auctions
Incomplete-information Games
Bayesian Battle of the Sexes
Second-price Auctions
First-price Auctions (Uniform Case)
Order Statistics and Revenue Equivalence
ICA: Auction Experiments

Essentials of Game Theory: Chapter 7, by Kevin Leyton-Brown and Yoav Shoham
Bayesian Games & Games of Incomplete Information, by Mohammad T. Hagiaghayi
3 Introduction to Mechanism Design
The Envelope Theorem
The Revelation Principle

On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B
Badminton and the Science of Rule Making
Real Badminton Rally
Fixed Badminton Rally
4 Welfare Maximization & Myerson's Lemma
Auction Design Goals
Myerson's Payment Characterization
Applications of Myerson's Lemma
Sponsored Search

Myerson's Lemma (Stanford CS 364A)
5 Revenue Maximization & Myerson's Theorem
Myerson's Optimal Auction
Applications of Myerson's Theorem
Regular and MHR Distributions

Myerson's Theorem (Stanford CS 364A)
6 Multiparameter Auctions
The VCG Mechanism
Winner Determination

Multiparameter mechanism design (Stanford CS 364A)
7 EPIC Auctions
Spectrum Auctions
Ascending Auctions
SAAs with Additive Valuations
EPIC Ascending Auctions
SAAs with Additive Valuations, cont'd

The Magic of Auctions
EPIC Auctions (Stanford CS 364B)
8 Clinching Auction
Clinching Auction

Clinching Auction (Stanford CS 364B)
9 Walrasian Equilibrium
Unit-Demand Valuations and the CK Auction

Unit-Demand Valuations (Stanford CS 364B)
CK Auction (Stanford CS 364B)