The information contained in these lecture notes was compiled by the course TAs in 2017 and 2018, including Takehiro Oyakawa, Gianluca Pane, Gabe Bankman-Fried, and Enrique Areyan-Viqueira. They based these notes in large part on the lecture notes and accompanying videos of Tim Roughgarden's CS 364A and CS 364B courses at Stanford, and Jason Hartline's Mechanism Design and Approximation textbook.

Lecture Topic Readings
0 Welcome to CSCI 1440/2440 Guidelines for Class Participation
1 Introduction to Game Theory
Normal-Form Games
Battle of the Sexes
Beauty Contest

Essentials of Game Theory: Chapters 1 & 2 by Kevin Leyton-Brown and Yoav Shoham
Rock, Paper, Scissors (The Simpsons)
The Prisoners' Dilemma (Dilbert)
2 Introduction to Auctions
Incomplete-information Games
Bayesian Battle of the Sexes
Second-price Auctions
First-price Auctions (Uniform Case)
Order Statistics and Revenue Equivalence

Essentials of Game Theory: Chapter 7, by Kevin Leyton-Brown and Yoav Shoham
Bayesian Games & Games of Incomplete Information, by Mohammad T. Hagiaghayi
The Common Prior Assumption
Notes on Revenue Equivalence
3 Introduction to Mechanism Design
The Revelation Principle
Auction Design Goals
The VCG Mechanism

Real Badminton Rally
Fixed Badminton Rally
Badminton Rule-Making Article
4 Welfare Maximization & Myerson's Lemma
Myerson via the Envelope Theorem
Myerson's Payment Characterization
Applications of Myerson's Lemma
Sponsored Search

Myerson's Lemma (Stanford CS 364A)
5 Revenue Maximization & Myerson's Theorem
Myerson's Optimal Auction
Applications of Myerson's Theorem

Myerson's Theorem (Stanford CS 364A)
6 Posted-Price Mechanisms
Regular and MHR Distributions
Inverse Transform Sampling
Introduction to Approximation Algorithms
Posted-Price Mechanisms: Bidder Behavior
Posted-Price Mechanisms: Approximating Revenue
Posted-Price Mechanisms: Approximating Welfare

Prior-Independent Approximations (Mechanism Design & Approximation)
7 Simple vs. Optimal Mechanisms
Prophet Inequality
Bulow and Klemperer's Theorem

Prophet Inequality and Bulow-Klemperer (Stanford CS 364A)
An Economic View of Prophet Inequalities
A Tutorial on Prophets and Secretaries
8 Final Projects
Spectrum Auctions
AdX Game
9 Iterative Auctions
Combinatorial Auctions
Ascending Auctions

The Magic of Auctions
10 EPIC Auctions
SAAs with Additive Valuations
EPIC Ascending Auctions
SAAs with Additive Valuations, cont'd

EPIC Auctions (Stanford CS 364B)
11 Walrasian Equilibrium
Unit-Demand Valuations and the CK Auction

Unit-Demand Valuations (Stanford CS 364B)
CK Auction (Stanford CS 364B)