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Lectures

The information contained in these lecture notes was compiled by the course TAs in 2017 and 2018, including Takehiro Oyakawa, Gianluca Pane, Gabe Bankman-Fried, and Enrique Areyan-Viqueira. They based these notes in large part on the lecture notes and accompanying videos of Tim Roughgarden's CS 364A and CS 364B courses at Stanford, and Jason Hartline's Mechanism Design and Approximation textbook.

Lecture	Topic	Readings
0	Welcome Applications Logistics
1	Introduction to Game Theory Normal-Form Games Battle of the Sexes ICA: Beauty Contest	Rock, Paper, Scissors (The Simpsons) The Prisoners' Dilemma (Dilbert)
2	Introduction to Auctions Incomplete-Information Games Bayesian Battle of the Sexes Independent Private Values Second-price Auctions First-price Auctions (Uniform Case)	Bayesian Games & Games of Incomplete Information, by Mohammad T. Hagiaghayi
3	Introduction to Mechanism Design Order Statistics and Revenue Equivalence Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle The Envelope Theorem
4	Welfare Maximization & Myerson's Lemma Auction Model and Design Goals Myerson's Payment Characterization Applications of Myerson's Lemma Sponsored Search	On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B Badminton and the Science of Rule Making Real Badminton Rally vs. Fixed Badminton Rally Myerson's Lemma (Stanford CS 364A)
5	Revenue Maximization & Myerson's Theorem Myerson's Optimal Auction Applications of Myerson's Theorem Regular and MHR Distributions	Myerson's Theorem (Stanford CS 364A)