Prof. John E. Savage
Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar by Martin Libicki, Rand, 2009
Disinformation, and Strategic Communications: How One Interagency Group
Made a Major Difference by Fletcher Schoen and Christopher J. Lamb,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Perspective, No. 11,
National Defense University, June 2012
Toward Theory for Dissuasion (or Deterrence) by Denial:
Using Simple Cognitive Models of the Adversary to Inform Strategy
by Paul K. Davis, RAND NSRD WR-1027, January 2014
"This Working Paper grew out a conference paper presented at the Munk
School of the University of Toronto, October 18-20, 2013. The conference,
Deterrence by Denial: Theory, Practice, and Empiricism, was co-organized
by the Munk School of Global Affairs and the Center for Security Studies,
How the United States Can Win the Cyberwar
of the Future:
Cold War-era deterrence theory won't cut it anymore.
by P.W. Singer, Foreign Policy, December 18, 2015
"There is perhaps no national security problem more 21st century in both
its definition and form than cybersecurity. And yet to solve it, the ready
solution in nearly every U.S. national security conversation today is that
tried and true 20th-century framework of deterrence."
Cyber-Deterrence by Kim Taipale, Boston Global Forum, December 12, 2016
Raising the Consequences of Hacking American Companies: Why the United
States Needs an Explicit Cyber Deterrence Policy for the Private
Sector by David A. Simons, CSIS, October 2017
Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace by Joseph S. Nye Jr.,
International Security, Vol. 41, No. 3, Winter 2016/2017
Deterring Cyberattacks How to Reduce Vulnerability by Susan
Hennessy, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2017
Botched CIA Communications System Helped Blow Cover of Chinese Agents:
The number of informants executed in the debacle is higher than
initially thought. by Zach Dorfman, Foreign Policy, August 15, 2018
Revealed: Pentagon Push to Hack Nuke Missiles Before They Launch:
A former U.S. official calls the 2017 Pentagon policy document an
'exercise to legally justify a potential attack on a North Korean
missile on the launchpad.'
From the article: "The Pentagon has embraced a controversial policy of destroying enemy
nuclear missiles before they launch, an internal policy document from
May 2017 shows. Itb bs an effort that appears to include executing
cyberattacks against missile control systems or components."
The Pentagon document
Concept of Operations and Employment Guidelines for Left-of-Launch
Capability is cited in the news article.
Is Deterrence Possible? by Timothy M. McKenzie, Colonel USAF, Air
University, January 2017
Hacking Back Without Cracking Up by Jeremy Rabkin, Ariel Rabkin,
Aegis Paper Series No.1606, Hoover Institution, June 28, 2016
The authors examine the risks and rewards of hacking back and conclude
that it is worth conducting experiments to determine its effectiveness. It
also refers to some interesting sources.
The Digital Vigilantes Who Hack Back:
American companies that fall victim to data breaches want to retaliate
against the culprits. But can they do so without breaking the law?
by Nicholas Schmidle, The New Yorker, May 7, 2018
This article provides an excellent introduction to hacking back. It
cites CFAA, provides analogies for hacking back such as use of dye packs
by banks, and discusses nascent effortsB to legalize some types of
hackback, which some call vigilantism. It also highlights the difficulty
of attributing hackers, calls attention to "escalation dominance," and
notes that hackers do make serious personal threats against those
hacking back. Several experts warn that hacking back can be very
dangerous and could lead to cyberwar.
Assessment of Deterrence Strategies
Not The Cyber Deterrence the United States Wants
by Jason Healey, Council on Foreign Relations, June 11, 2018
What War Games Tell Us About the Use of Cyber Weapons in a Crisis
by Jacquelyn G. Schneider, The Council on Foreign Relations, June 21,2018
The Limits of Deterrence Theory in Cyberspace by Mariarosaria
Taddeo, Philos. Technol. (2018) 31: 339.
I ... argue that ... applicability [of deterrence] to cyberspace is
limited and that these limits are not trivial.
On the Theft and Reuse of Advanced Offensive Cyber Weapons
by Gil Baram, Defense One, June 19, 2018
Symantec warns of China-based espionage campaign targeting satellites
by Olivia Beavers, The Hill, June 20, 2018
Trump, Seeking to Relax Rules on U.S. Cyberattacks, Reverses Obama
Directive: Administration has faced pressure to show that it is taking
seriously national-security cyberthreats by Dustin Volz, The Wall
Street Journal, August 15, 2018
Legality of Cyber Operations
US DoD Laws of War Manual (Updated December 2016)
Page 1012 of Chapter XVI
applies these laws to Cyber Operations.
Section 22.214.171.124 Examples of Cyber Operations on page 1012 refers to the pre-emplacement of capabilities or weapons.
Ex-NSA Hackers Worry China And Russia Will Try to Arrest Them:
The US government has been indicting foreign government hackers, and
American government hackers are worried China and Russia might start
doing the same to them.
by Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Motherboard, December 1, 2017
Guide to Cyberspace Operations
The Cyber Security Forum Initiative
The Joint Force Commander's Guide to Cyberspace Operations
by Brett T. Williams, USAF