

Operating Systems Security

CS 1660: Introduction to Computer Systems Security

Attribution


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- Examples of race conditions by Kevin Du

What is an Operating System?

How applications (and you) interface with the hardware

Provides abstractions for using:


- CPU
- Memory
- Files / folders
- Windows
- Network
- Cursor
- Application




Operating System Layers

The OS has many layers of abstraction:

- The **kernel**: core of the OS, responsible for controlling hardware, resource access
 - Various subsystems (memory management, networking, storage, ...)
- Execution modes:
 - **user mode**: access to resources mediated by the kernel
 - **kernel mode**: full and direct access to resources





Processes

- The kernel manages applications as processes (or threads)
- An application can have multiple processes
- Every process has
 - Process ID (PID) ↗
 - Effective user_
- Kernel provides
 - Separate address space from other processes
 - Time/resource sharing between other running processes

Processes as a Tree

- **Node**: process
- **Edge**: connect a process (child) to the one that started it (parent)
- Child process inherits some **context** from parent process

Linux: PID 1 is the first process, which starts others at boot time

```
emplisi@ubuntu:~$ pstree
systemd--ModemManager--2*[{ModemManager}]
        --NetworkManager--2*[{NetworkManager}]
        --VGAAuthService
        --accounts-daemon--2*[{accounts-daemon}]
        --acpid
        --anacron--sh--run-parts--mlocate--flock--updatedb
        --avahi-daemon--avahi-daemon
        --bluetoothd
        --boltd--2*[{boltd}]
        --colord--2*[{colord}]
        --cron
        --cups-browsed--2*[{cups-browsed}]
        --cupsd
        --dbus-daemon
        --firefox--3*[Web Content--18*[{Web Content}]]
                --Web Content--19*[{Web Content}]
                --WebExtensions--18*[{WebExtensions}]
                --file:/// Content--18*[{file:/// Content}]
                --59*[{firefox}]
        --fwupd--4*[{fwupd}]
        --gdm3--gdm-session-work--gdm-wayland-session--gnome-session
```



Activity Monitor

All Processes



CPU

Memory

Energy

Disk

Network

Search

Process Name	Mem...	Threads	Ports	PID	User
Virtual Machine Service	4.00 GB	9	65	1253	deemer
IntelliJ IDEA	2.31 GB	60	431	13892	deemer
Firefox	1.71 GB	83	617	38838	deemer
Microsoft PowerPoint	1.00 GB	22	4,997	37563	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	993.1 MB	25	122	38850	deemer
WindowServer	911.7 MB	12	4,844	166	_windowserver
Preview	431.5 MB	4	715	35921	deemer
kernel_task	426.8 MB	178	0	0	root
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	349.2 MB	23	100	38861	deemer
Discord Helper (Renderer)	348.2 MB	40	657	13388	deemer
FirefoxCP WebExtensions	324.2 MB	23	98	38845	deemer
Dropbox	303.4 MB	142	1,747	75625	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	286.6 MB	23	117	38860	deemer
Terminal	257.1 MB	7	450	1997	deemer
Finder	245.6 MB	9	1,291	416	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	241.2 MB	24	103	38859	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	232.3 MB	23	101	38851	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	212.2 MB	24	98	38862	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	208.0 MB	24	103	38856	deemer
Google Chrome	205.8 MB	33	839	2200	deemer
FirefoxCP Isolated Web Content	204.6 MB	23	102	38849	deemer

MEMORY PRESSURE



Physical Memory: 8.00 GB
Memory Used: 6.68 GB
Cached Files: 1.56 GB
Swap Used: 6.01 GB

App Memory: 3.06 GB
Wired Memory: 2.43 GB
Compressed: 916.9 MB

View Processes in Linux

- **ps**: displays snapshot of running processes
 - **ps -ef** : show all processes
 - **ps -u <username>**: show processes for a user
- **Top, htop**: Fancyier list of processes
 - **top -u <username>**: filter by username
- **kill <pid>**: Send signal to a process (usually to terminate it)

```
metcalfe /u/lmeyerov % ps -ef
UID      PID  PPID  C  STIME TTY          TIME CMD
root      1    0  0  2005 ?        00:00:01 init [2]
root      2    1  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [ksoftirqd/0]
root      3    1  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [events/0]
root      4    3  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [khelper]
root     31    3  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [kblockd/0]
root     104   31  0  2005 ?        00:00:01 [pdflush]
root     105   31  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [pdflush]
root     107   31  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [aio/0]
root     106   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:03 [kswapd0]
root      694   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [kseriod]
root      745   30  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [ata/0]
root      750   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [scsi_eh_2]
root      751   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [scsi_eh_3]
root      769   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:02 [kjournald]
root     1157   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [khudb]
root     1263   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [kjournald]
root     1264   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [kjournald]
root     1265   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [kjournald]
root     1266   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:06 [kjournald]
root     1521   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [khpsbpkt]
root     1584   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 [knodemgrd_0]
root     2813   10  0  2005 ?        00:00:00 dhclient -e -pf /var/run/dhclient
```

```
top - 14:23:25 up 41 days, 20:45, 10 users, load average: 0.02, 0.12, 0.19
Tasks: 142 total, 1 running, 140 sleeping, 0 stopped, 1 zombie
Cpu(s): 3.7% us, 0.7% sy, 0.0% ni, 95.7% id, 0.0% wa, 0.0% hi, 0.0% si
Mem: 1034436k total, 910324k used, 124112k free, 183132k buffers
Swap: 1048816k total, 4892k used, 1043924k free, 222260k cached
Which user (blank for all):
PID USER      PR  NI  VIRT  RES  SHR  S  %CPU  %MEM     TIME+ COMMAND
4104 root        5 -10 180m 50m 6724 S  1.0  5.0   2:42.53 XFree86
13091 lmeyerov   15  0 132m 72m 26m S  1.0  7.2   17:22.59 mozilla-bin
21114 lmeyerov   15  0 36876 17m 13m S  1.0  1.7    0:01.38 ksnapshot
24555 lmeyerov   15  0 21128 7508 5460 S  0.7  0.7    0:00.79 artsd
21270 lmeyerov  17  0 2036 1116 860 R  0.7  0.1    0:00.02 top
1 root        16  0 1504 528 468 S  0.0  0.1    0:01.32 init
2 root       35 19  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:00.28 ksoftirqd/0
3 root        5 -10  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:00.85 events/0
4 root        6 -10  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:00.00 khelper
31 root        5 -10  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:00.61 kblockd/0
104 root       15  0  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:01.81 pdflush
105 root       15  0  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:00.32 pdflush
107 root       15 -10  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:00.00 aio/0
106 root       15  0  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:03.65 kswapd0
694 root       25  0  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:00.00 kseriod
745 root        6 -10  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:00.00 ata/0
750 root       18  0  0  0  0 S  0.0  0.0    0:00.00 scsi_eh_2
```


Process Management

- Each process has a **context**, which includes the user, parent process, and address space (for storing data and instructions)
- Access control policies determine which resources can be accessed by each process and which other processes it can control

System Calls (Syscalls)

- Primary way processes interact with kernel
- OS provides a "library" of syscalls for nearly all OS functions
 - Files: `read`, `write`, `open`, `close`, `chmod`, ...
 - Process management: `fork`, `clone`, `kill`, ...
 - Networking: `socket`, `bind`, `connect`, ...
- On syscall, process "yields" to kernel, executes syscall in kernel mode

→ TRANSITION BETWEEN USER / KERNEL MODE.

System Services (Daemons)

- Background process that performs common tasks for system
- Typically start at boot time
- Could run with higher permissions than users
- Typical services:
 - Remote SSH connections
 - Web servers
 - Logging

AUTHENTICATION, AUTHORIZATION, ACCOUNTING

AAA (recap)

- **Authorization** is the function of specifying access rights to resources (**access control**)
- To authorize => to define access policy

How DO WE DO THIS IN
AN OS?

Users

- Each process is associated with a user
- Specific users can have more privileges than regular users
 - Install or remove programs
 - Change rights of other users
 - Modify the configuration of the system
- Unix:
 - The **root** is a “super-user” with no restrictions

How TO CONTROL WHAT USERS CAN ACCESS?
⇒ AUTHORIZATION

How TO KNOW WHAT A USER IS DOING?
⇒ ACCOUNTING.

ONE WAY

Discretionary Access Control (DAC)

LINVT

- Users can protect what they **own**
 - The **owner** may grant access to others
 - The **owner** may define the type of access (read/write/execute) given to others
- DAC is the standard model used in operating systems
- Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
 - Multiple levels of security for users and documents (i.e. confidential, restricted, secret, top secret)
 - A user can create documents with just their level of security

General Principles

- Files and folders are managed by the operating system
- Applications, including shells, access files through an API
- Access control entry (ACE)
 - Allow/deny a certain type of access to a file/folder by user/group
- Access control list (ACL)
 - Collection of ACEs for a file/folder

Access Control Entries and Lists

- An **Access Control List** (ACL) for a resource (e.g., a file or folder) is a sorted list of zero or more **Access Control Entries** (ACEs)
- An ACE refers specifies that a certain set of accesses (e.g., read, execute and write) to the resources is allowed or denied for a user or group
- Examples of ACEs for folder "Bob's CS166 Grades" WINDOWS
 - Bob; Read; Allow
 - TAs; Read; Allow
 - TWD; Read, Write; Allow
 - Bob; Write; Deny
 - TAs; Write; Allow

NEED TO "COMBINE" OR "COMPOSE"
ENTRIES TO FIGURE OUT ACCESS

⇒ NEED TO "COMBINE" OR "COMPOSE"
RULES TO FIGURE OUT ACCESS

Closed vs. Open Policy

*"DEFAULT"
RULE.*

Closed policy

- Also called “default secure”
- Give Tom read access to “foo”
- Give Bob r/w access to “bar”
- Tom: I would like to read “foo”
 - Access allowed
- Tom: I would like to read “bar”
 - Access denied

Open Policy

- Deny Tom read access to “foo”
- Deny Bob r/w access to “bar”
- Tom: I would like to read “foo”
 - Access denied
- Tom: I would like to read “bar”
 - Access allowed

Closed Policy with Negative Authorizations and Deny Priority

- Give Tom r/w access to “bar”
- Deny Tom write access to “bar”
- Tom: I would like to read “bar”
 - Access allowed
- Tom: I would like to write “bar”
 - Access denied
- Policy is used by Windows to manage access control to the file system

Role-Based Access Control


- Within an organization **roles** are created for various job functions
- The permissions to perform certain operations are assigned to specific roles
- Users are assigned particular role, with which they acquire the computer authorizations
- Users are not assigned permissions directly, but only acquire them through their role



U.S. Navy image in the public domain.

Access Control: File System

UNIX PERMISSIONS: AN OVERVIEW



A COUPLE OF OTHER BITS

- STICKY (T): ONLY OWNER CAN MOVE/RENAME

SETUID

- RUNS WITH PERMISSIONS OF OWNER, REGARDLESS OF WHO IS RUNNING IT. (SHOWS AS "S" IN OWNER'S X BIT)
↑
"ELEVATING" PERMISSIONS

SETGID

FOR FILES
- RUNS WITH PERMISSIONS OF GROUP, REGARDLESS OF WHO IS RUNNING IT.

- FOR DIRECTORY: NEW FILES MADE IN THIS DIRECTORY HAVE THIS GROUP.

("INHERITING" PERMISSIONS)

UNIX PERMISSIONS (DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL)

- ALL FILES/DIRS HAVE ONE OWNER, ONE GROUP BY DEFAULT

- ONLY OWNER CAN CHANGE PERMISSIONS


⇒ SOUND INFLEXIBLE? IT IS.

AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: ACCESS CONTROL LIST

- DENY USER A: RW ←
- ALLOW USER B: RWX
- ALLOW GROUP C: R
- DEFAULT: {R, RW, NONE, ...}

ROLE-BASED (RBAC)

- USED BY WINDOWS
- OPTIONAL ON LINUX



RWX	
000	0
001	1
010	2
011	3
100	4 ←
101	5 ←
110	6 ←
111	7 ←

CHMOD 644

110 100 100

RW-R--R--

THE FOLLOWING
SLIDES

HAVE MUCH MORE DETAIL
THAN WE COVERED
IN CLASS.

FEEL FREE TO USE
THEM AS REFERENCE
NOTES!

(WE'LL ALSO TALK ABOUT
MORE EXAMPLES IN CLASS)

Linux vs. Windows

- Linux

- Allow-only ACEs
- Access to file depends on ACL of file and of all its ancestor folders
- Start at root of file system
- Traverse path of folders
- Each folder must have execute (cd) permission
- Different paths to same file not equivalent
- File's ACL must allow requested access

- Windows

- Allow and deny ACEs
- By default, deny ACEs precede allow ones
- Access to file depends only on file's ACL
- ACLs of ancestors ignored when access is requested
- Permissions set on a folder usually propagated to descendants (inheritance)
- System keeps track of inherited ACE's

Linux File Access Control

- File Access Control for:
 - Files
 - Directories
 - Therefore...
 - `\dev\` : *devices*
 - `\mnt\` : *mounted file systems*
 - What else? *Sockets, pipes, symbolic links...*

Unix Permissions

- Standard for all UNIXes
- Every file is owned by a user and has an associated group
- Permissions often displayed in compact 10-character notation
- To see permissions, use `ls -l`


```
jk@sphere:~/test$ ls -l
```

```
total 0
```

```
-rw-r----- 1 jk ugrad 0 2005-10-13 07:18 file1
```

```
-rwxrwxrwx 1 jk ugrad 0 2005-10-13 07:18 file2
```

Unix File Types and Basic Permissions



Permissions Examples (Regular Files)

-rw-r—r--	read/write for owner, read-only for everyone else
-rw-r-----	read/write for owner, read-only for group, forbidden to others
-rwx-----	read/write/execute for owner, forbidden to everyone else
-r--r--r--	read-only to everyone, including owner
-rwxrwxrwx	read/write/execute to everyone

Permissions for Directories

- Permissions bits interpreted differently for directories
- *Read* bit allows listing names of files in directory, but not their properties like size and permissions
- *Write* bit allows creating and deleting files within the directory
- *Execute* bit allows entering the directory and getting properties of files in the directory
- Lines for directories in `ls -l` output begin with d, as below:

```
jk@sphere:~/test$ ls -l
```

```
Total 4
```

```
drwxr-xr-x  2 jk  ugrad 4096 2005-10-13 07:37 dir1
-rw-r--r--  1 jk  ugrad   0 2005-10-13 07:18 file1
```

Permissions Examples (Directories)

<code>drwxr-xr-x</code>	all can enter and list the directory, only owner can add/delete files
<code>drwxrwx---</code>	full access to owner and group, forbidden to others
<code>drwx--x---</code>	full access to owner, group can access known filenames in directory, forbidden to others
<code>-rwxrwxrwx</code>	full access to everyone

The /tmp Directory

- In Unix systems, directory /tmp is
 - Readable by any user
 - Writable by any user
 - Usually wiped on reboot
- Convenience
 - Place for temporary files used by applications
 - Files in /tmp are not subject to the user's space quota
- What could go wrong

Special Permission Bits

Three other important permission bits

- Set-user-ID (“suid” or “setuid”) bit
- Set-group-ID (“sgid” or “setgid”) bit
- Sticky bit

setuid bit: Set-user-ID

- On executable files, causes the program to **run as file owner regardless of who runs it**
- How to view: shown as s instead of x
 - rwsr-xr-x**: setuid, executable by all
 - rwxr-xr-x**: executable by all, but not setuid
 - rwSr--r--**: setuid, but not executable - not useful

Setuid Programs

- Unix processes have two user IDs:
 - **real user ID**: user launching the process
 - **effective user ID**: user whose privileges are granted to the process
- An executable file can have the **set-user-ID** property (**setuid**) enabled
- If a user A executes **setuid** file owned by B, then the effective user ID of the process is B and not A

Setuid Programs

- System call `setuid(uid)` allows a process to change its effective user ID to `uid`
- Some programs that access system resources are owned by root and have the setuid bit set (`setuid programs`)
 - e.g., `passwd` and `su`
- Writing secure setuid programs is tricky because vulnerabilities may be exploited by malicious user actions

setgid bit: Set-group-ID

- On executable files, causes the program to run with the file's group, regardless of whether the user who runs it is in that group
- On directories, causes files created within the directory to have the same group as the directory, useful for directories shared by multiple users with different default groups
- How to view: replaces 7th character (x or -) with s (or S if not also executable)
 - rw**xr-sr-x: setgid file, executable by all
 - drwxrwsr-x: setgid directory; files within will have group of directory
 - rw-r-Sr--: setgid file, but not executable - not useful

Sticky Bit

- On directories, prevents users from deleting or renaming files they do not own
- Ignored for everything else
- In 10-character display, replaces 10th character (x or -) with t (or T if not also executable)

`drwxrwxrwt`: sticky bit set, full access for everyone

`drwxrwx--T`: sticky bit set, full access by user/group

`drwxr--r-T`: sticky, full owner access, others can read (*useless*)

Symbolic Link

- In Unix, a symbolic link (aka symlink) is a file that points to (stores the path of) another file
- A process accessing a symbolic link is transparently redirected to accessing the destination of the symbolic link
- Symbolic links can be chained, but not to form a cycle
- `ln -s really_long_directory/even_longer_file_name myfile`

Octal Notation

- Standard syntax is nice for simple cases, but bad for complex changes
 - Alternative is octal notation, i.e., three or four digits from 0 to 7
- Digits from left (most significant) to right(least significant):
[special bits][user bits][group bits][other bits]
- Special bit digit =
(4 if setuid) + (2 if setgid) + (1 if sticky)
- All other digits =
(4 if readable) + (2 if writable) + (1 if executable)

Octal Notation Examples

644 or 0644	read/write for owner, read-only for everyone else
775 or 0775	read/write/execute for owner and group, read/execute for others
640 or 0640	read/write for owner, read-only for group, forbidden to others
2775	same as 775, plus setgid (useful for directories)
777 or 0777	read/write/execute to everyone (<i>dangerous!</i>)
1777	same as 777, plus sticky bit

Root

- “root” account is a super-user account, like Administrator on Windows
- Multiple roots possible
- File permissions do not restrict root
- This is *dangerous*, but necessary, and OK with good practices

Becoming Root

- **su**
 - Changes home directory, PATH, and shell to that of root, but doesn't touch most of environment and doesn't run login scripts
- **sudo <command>**
 - Run just one command as root
- **su [-] <user>**
 - Become another non-root user
 - Root does not require to enter password

Changing Permissions


- Permissions are changed with **chmod** or through a GUI like Konqueror
- Only the file owner or root can change permissions
- If a user owns a file, the user can use **chgrp** to set its group to any group of which the user is a member
- root can change file ownership with **chown** (and can optionally change group in the same command)
- **chown**, **chmod**, and **chgrp** can take the **-R** option to recur through subdirectories

Examples of Changing Permissions

<code>chown -R root dir1</code>	Changes ownership of dir1 and everything within it to root
<code>chmod g+w,o-rwx file1 file2</code>	Adds group write permission to file1 and file2, denying all access to others
<code>chmod -R g=rwX dir1</code>	Adds group read/write permission to dir1 and everything within it, and group execute permission on files or directories where someone has execute permission
<code>chgrp testgrp file1</code>	Sets file1's group to testgrp, if the user is a member of that group
<code>chmod u+s file1</code>	Sets the setuid bit on file1. (Doesn't change execute bit.)

Limitations of Unix Permissions

- Unix permissions are not perfect
 - Groups are restrictive
 - Limitations on file creation
- Linux optionally uses POSIX ACLs
 - Builds on top of traditional Unix permissions
 - Several users and groups can be named in ACLs, each with different permissions
 - Allows for finer-grained access control
- Each ACL is of the form *type:[name]:rwx*
 - Setuid, setgid, and sticky bits are outside the ACL system



What We Have Learned

- What is an operating system
- Processes, users, services
- Access control models (DAC and RBAC)
- Setuid programs
- Dangers of symlinks, setuid, and shared directories
 - A demo if you are “Gone for Ten Seconds”