

CSCI 1515 Applied Cryptography

This Lecture:

- Cryptographic Hash Functions
- Putting it All Together: Secure Communication
- Pseudorandom Generator (PRG)
Pseudorandom Function (PRF)
Pseudorandom Permutation (PRP)


Summary

	Symmetric-Key	Public-Key
Message Secrecy	Primitive: SKE Construction: block cipher	Primitive: PKE Constructions: RSA / ElGamal
Message Integrity	Primitive: MAC Constructions: CBC-MAC / HMAC	Primitive: Signature Constructions: RSA / DSA
Secrecy & Integrity	Primitive: AE Construction: Encrypt-then-MAC	
Key Exchange		Construction: Diffie-Hellman
Important Tool	Primitive: Hash function Construction: SHA	

Hash Function

$$H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n \quad \nearrow \theta(\lambda)$$

$$\lambda = 128$$
$$n = 256$$



Collision-Resistant Hash Function (CRHF):

It's computationally hard to find $x, y \in \{0,1\}^*$ s.t.

$$x \neq y, \quad H(x) = H(y) \quad (\text{collision})$$

Birthday Problem / Paradox

There are q students in a class.


Assume each student's birthday is a random $y_i \in [365]$

What's the probability of a collision?

$$q = 366 \Rightarrow \text{prob.} = 1$$

$$q = 23 \Rightarrow \text{prob.} \approx 50\%$$

$$q = 70 \Rightarrow \text{prob.} \approx 99.9\%$$

$$y_i \in [N]$$


$$q = N + 1 \Rightarrow \text{prob.} = 1$$



$$q = \sqrt{N} \Rightarrow \text{prob.} \approx 50\%$$


$$2^{128}$$

$$\sqrt{N} = 2^{128} \Rightarrow N = 2^{256} \Rightarrow n = 256$$

Random Oracle Model

$$H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$$



Applications of Hash Functions

- Deduplication

$$\begin{aligned} H(D_1) &\rightarrow h_1 \\ H(D_2) &\rightarrow h_2 \end{aligned}$$

← unique identifier

$$\text{If } h_1 \neq h_2 \Rightarrow D_1 \neq D_2$$

$$\text{If } h_1 = h_2 \Rightarrow D_1 = D_2 \text{ (why?)}$$

Virus Scan

$$H(F) \stackrel{?}{=} H(F^*)$$

Video Deduplication

$$H(V_1) \stackrel{?}{=} H(V_2)$$

Applications of Hash Functions

- **HMAC**

$$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}$$

$$\text{Mac}_k(m) = H(k \parallel m)$$

$$\text{HMAC}_k(m) = H(\underbrace{k_2}_{k \oplus \text{opad}} \parallel \underbrace{H(\underbrace{k_1}_{k \oplus \text{ipad}} \parallel m)})$$

public

$$\text{Mac}_k(m) \rightarrow t$$

$$\text{Vrfy}_k(m, t) \rightarrow 0/1$$

Hard to forge (m^*, t^*)
 $\parallel$
 $H(k \parallel m^*)$

- **Hash-and-Sign**: $\text{Sign}_{sk}(H(m))$

RSA Signature: $\text{Sign}_{sk}(m) = H(m)^d \bmod N$

- **Password-based Authentication**

$$\text{username}, H(\text{password})$$

Applications of Hash Functions

- HKDF (Key Derivation Function):

$$\text{HMAC}(g^{ab} \parallel \text{salt})$$


$$H(g^{ab} \parallel 0 \dots 0)$$

$$H(g^{ab} \parallel 0 \dots 1)$$

$$H(g^{ab} \parallel 0 \dots 10)$$


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Pseudorandom Generator (PRG)



- Fast Membership Proof (Merkle Tree)
 - Blockchain
 - Key Transparency

Putting it All Together: Secure Communication



Any security issues?

Signal: Diffie-Hellman Ratchet

Alice



$\Downarrow a_1$
 $g^{a_1 b_1}$
 $\Downarrow$
 k_1

$\Downarrow a_2$
 $g^{a_2 b_1}$
 $\Downarrow$
 k_2

$\Downarrow a_2$
 $g^{a_2 b_2}$
 $\Downarrow$
 k_3

$\xrightarrow{g^{a_1}}$
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
 $\xleftarrow{g^{b_1}}$

$\xrightarrow{g^{a_2}}$

$\xleftarrow{g^{b_2}}$

Bob



$\Downarrow b_1$
 $g^{a_1 b_1}$
 $\Downarrow$
 k_1

$\Downarrow b_1$
 $g^{a_2 b_1}$
 $\Downarrow$
 k_2

$\Downarrow b_2$
 $g^{a_2 b_2}$
 $\Downarrow$
 k_3

Adv. sees:

$g^{a_1} g^{b_1} g^{a_2} g^{b_2}$

If b_2 is leaked?

$(g^{a_1})^{b_1} \rightarrow g^{a_1 b_1} \rightarrow k_1$
 $(g^{a_2})^{b_1} \rightarrow g^{a_2 b_1} \rightarrow k_2$

If k_1 is leaked?


Only k_1

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Pseudorandom Function (PRF)


Pseudorandom Generator (PRG)



Pseudorandom Function (PRF): "random-looking" function


Pseudorandom Function (PRF)

Keyed Function $F: \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$



$k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^k$


$F_k:$



"looks like a random function"

Pseudorandom Function (PRF)

$$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \quad F_k:$$




How many possible F_k 's?
 2^λ

$\sum \sum c$ (not knowing k)

$$f \leftarrow \{ F \mid F: \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m \}$$


$$(2^m)^{2^n} = 2^{m \cdot 2^n} \quad f:$$



How many possible f 's?

Pseudorandom Permutation (PRP)

$$k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \quad F_k:$$




How many possible F_k 's?
 2^λ

$$f \leftarrow \{ F \mid F: \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n, \\ F \text{ is bijective} \}$$

$$2^n! \quad f:$$

$\sum \sum^c$ (not knowing k)



How many possible f 's?

$$2^n \cdot (2^n-1) \cdot (2^n-2) \cdots 1 \\ = 2^n!$$

Constructions for Hash Function

MD5: output length 128-bit
best known attack 2^{16}
Collision found in 2004

Secure Hash Functions (SHA): Standardized by NIST.

- SHA-0: Standardized in 1993
output length 160-bit
best known attack 2^{39}

- SHA-1: Standardized in 1995
output length 160-bit
best known attack 2^{63}
Collision found in 2017

- SHA-2: Standardized in 2001
output length 224, 256, 384, 512-bit

- SHA-3: Competition 2007-2012
released in 2015
output length 224, 256, 384, 512-bit