


# CSCI 1515 Applied Cryptography

## This Lecture:

- ZKP for OR Statements (Continued)
- Anonymous Online Voting (Continued)
- ElGamal Threshold Encryption
- RSA Blind Signature

# Anonymous Online Voting ( $g^{r_i}, pk^{r_i} \cdot g^{v_i}$ )



$Enc(\sum v_i)$     ( $g^{\sum r_i}, pk^{\sum r_i} \cdot g^{\sum v_i}$ )



Decrypt to  $\sum v_i$

How?

## Correctness of Encryption

Given a cyclic group  $G$  of order  $q$  with generator  $g$ .

Public key  $pk \in G$ .  $\leftarrow$  public

Ciphertext  $C = (C_1, C_2)$

## ZKP for an OR statement:

$C$  is an encryption of  $0$

OR

$C$  is an encryption of  $1$

**Witness:** randomness  $r$  used in encryption  
↑  
**secret**

$$R_L = \{ ((pk, c_1, c_2), r) : (c_1 = g^r \wedge c_2 = pk^r) \vee (c_1 = g^r \wedge c_2 = pk^r \cdot g) \}$$

↑      ↑  
 (public)      (secret)  
 Statement      Witness

## Correctness of Encryption

$C$  is an encryption of 0

$$(h, u, v) = (g^a, g^b, g^{ab})$$

$$b \text{ s.t. } u = g^b \wedge v = h^b$$

Witness: randomness  $r$  used in encryption

$$R_{L0} = \{ ((pk, c_1, c_2), r) : c_1 = g^r \wedge c_2 = pk^r \}$$

(public)  
Statement      (secret)  
Witness

Diffie-Hellman Tuple

$C$  is an encryption of 1

Witness: randomness  $r$  used in encryption

$$R_{L1} = \{ ((pk, c_1, c_2), r) : c_1 = g^r \wedge c_2 = pk^r \cdot g \}$$

(public)  
Statement      (secret)  
Witness

$$c_2/g = pk^r$$

$((pk, c_1, c_2/g), r) \leftarrow$  Diffie-Hellman Tuple

## Proving AND/OR Statements

AND: Statements:  $x_1, x_2$

Witnesses:  $w_1, w_2$

$$R_{\text{AND}} = \left\{ \left( (x_1, x_2), (w_1, w_2) \right) : (x_1, w_1) \in R_{L_1} \text{ AND } (x_2, w_2) \in R_{L_2} \right\}$$

OR: Statements:  $x_1, x_2$

Witness:  $w$


$$R_{\text{OR}} = \left\{ \left( (x_1, x_2), w \right) : (x_1, w) \in R_{L_1} \text{ OR } (x_2, w) \in R_{L_2} \right\}$$

## Example: Diffie-Hellman Tuple

Public: Cyclic group  $G$  of order  $q$ , generator  $g$ ,  $(h, u, v) = (g^a, g^b, g^{ab})$


Prover's secret witness:  $b$  s.t.  $u = g^b \wedge v = h^b$

$$R_L = \{ (h, u, v), b \}$$



## Proving OR Statement

$$R_{OR} = \{ (x_1, x_2, w) : (x_1, w) \in R_{L1} \text{ OR } (x_2, w) \in R_{L2} \}$$




How does Prover compute response for both statements?

Say  $(x_1, w) \in R_{L1}$

Completeness?

# Proving OR Statement

Proof of Knowledge?



How to extract  $w$  s.t.  $(x_1, w) \in R_{L_1}$  OR  $(x_2, w) \in R_{L_2}$  ?

# Proving OR Statement

Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge (HVZK) ?

Simulator

$(A_1, B_1)$      $(A_2, B_2)$

$\delta$

$(\delta_1, S_1)$      $(\delta_2, S_2)$

Verifier

$\delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$

$((A_1, B_1), \delta_1, S_1)$   
 $((A_2, B_2), \delta_2, S_2)$   
 $\delta = \delta_1 + \delta_2$

# Anonymous Online Voting ( $g^{r_i}, pk^{r_i} \cdot g^{v_i}$ )

ElGamal

ZKP

Voter 1

→

Enc ( $v_1$ )

$v_1 \in \{0, 1\}$

Voter 2

→

Enc ( $v_2$ )

$v_2 \in \{0, 1\}$

⋮

⋮

⋮

Voter n

→

Enc ( $v_n$ )

$v_n \in \{0, 1\}$



Enc ( $\sum v_i$ )

( $g^{\sum r_i}, pk^{\sum r_i} \cdot g^{\sum v_i}$ )



Decrypt to  $\sum v_i$

Who?

## Threshold Encryption

t-out-of-t threshold

$$\begin{aligned} P_1: (\text{pk}_1, \text{sk}_1) &\leftarrow \text{PartialGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{PK}_1 \\ P_2: (\text{pk}_2, \text{sk}_2) &\leftarrow \text{PartialGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{PK}_2 \\ \vdots & \\ P_t: (\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t) &\leftarrow \text{PartialGen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{PK}_t \end{aligned} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow \text{pk}$$

$$ct \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m)$$

$$\begin{aligned} P_1: d_1 &\leftarrow \text{PartialDec}(\text{sk}_1, ct) \rightarrow d_1 \\ P_2: d_2 &\leftarrow \text{PartialDec}(\text{sk}_2, ct) \rightarrow d_2 \\ \vdots & \\ P_t: d_t &\leftarrow \text{PartialDec}(\text{sk}_t, ct) \rightarrow d_t \end{aligned} \quad \left. \begin{array}{l} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow m$$

## Threshold Encryption : ElGamal



$$\left. \begin{array}{l} P_1: sk_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q \quad pk_1 = g^{sk_1} \rightarrow pk_1 \\ P_2: sk_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q \quad pk_2 = g^{sk_2} \rightarrow pk_2 \\ \vdots \\ P_t: sk_t \in \mathbb{Z}_q \quad pk_t = g^{sk_t} \rightarrow pk_t \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow pk = \prod pk_i$$

$sk = ?$

$$ct = (c_1, c_2) = (g^r, pk^r \cdot g^m)$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} P_1: d_1 = c_1^{sk_1} \rightarrow d_1 \\ P_2: d_2 = c_1^{sk_2} \rightarrow d_2 \\ \vdots \\ P_t: d_t = c_1^{sk_t} \rightarrow d_t \end{array} \right\} \Rightarrow m = ?$$

# Anonymous Online Voting



## Correctness of Partial Decryption

Given a cyclic group  $G$  of order  $q$  with generator  $g$ .

Partial public key  $pk_i \in G$ .

Ciphertext  $c = (c_1, c_2)$  public


Partial decryption  $d_i$

Witness: partial secret key  $ski \leftarrow \text{private}$


ZKP for partial decryption:

$$R_L = \{ ((c_1, pk_i, d_i), ski) : \begin{matrix} \uparrow \\ x \end{matrix} \quad \begin{matrix} \uparrow \\ \text{Witness} \end{matrix} \quad pk_i = g^{ski} \wedge d_i = c_1^{ski} \}$$

## Blind Signature



# RSA Blind Signature



$$VK = (N, e) \quad SK = d$$

$$\text{Sign}_{SK}(m) = H(m)^d \bmod N$$

$$\text{Vrfy}_{VK}(m, \sigma): \sigma^e \stackrel{?}{=} H(m) \pmod{N}$$

Signer

$$(VK, SK) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$$

$\text{Sign}_{\text{Blind}SK}(m')$ :

$$\sigma' := (m')^d$$


$$\begin{matrix} m = ? \\ \downarrow \\ m' \end{matrix}$$

Requester

$\text{Blind}(m)$ :

$$r \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$$

$$m' := H(m) \cdot r^e \bmod N$$



$\text{Unblind}(\sigma', r)$ :

$$\sigma := \sigma' \cdot r^{-1} \bmod N$$