CSCI 1515 Applied Cryptography

This Lecture:

- RSA Encryption (Continued)
- ElGamal Encryption
- Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
- Message Integrity
- Syntax of MAC & Signature

RSA Encryption

- $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$: $n = \Theta(\lambda)$ $n = 1024$, key length 2048

  Generate two n-bit primes p, q ← How? Pick an arbitrary p ⇒ Miller-Rabin

  Compute $N = p \cdot q$, $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$

  Choose e s.t. $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$ ← How?

  Compute $d = e^{-1} \bmod \phi(N)$ ← How?

  $pk = (N, e)$ $\quad sk = d$.



- $\text{Enc}_{pk}(m)$: $c = m^e \bmod N$ ← How (efficiently)?
- $\text{Dec}_{sk}(c)$: $m = c^d \bmod N$ ← How (efficiently)?

Correctness: $(m^e)^d = m^{ed} \equiv m \bmod N$

$e \cdot d \equiv 1 \bmod \phi(N)$

$m^{\phi(N)} \equiv 1 \bmod N$

$e \cdot d = \phi(N) \cdot k + 1$

$m^{ed} = m^{\phi(N) \cdot k + 1} \equiv 1^k \cdot m \equiv m \pmod N$

Any security issue?

Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) Security



RSA Assumption

- **Factoring Assumption:**

  Generate two n-bit primes p, q

  Compute $N = p \cdot q$

  Given N, it's computationally hard to find p & q (classically).

- **RSA Assumption:**

  Generate two n-bit primes p, q

  Compute $N = p \cdot q$, $\phi(N) = (p-1)(q-1)$

  Choose e s.t. $\gcd(e, \phi(N)) = 1$

  Compute $d = e^{-1} \bmod \phi(N)$

  Given N & a random $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, it's computationally hard to find x s.t.

  $$x^e \equiv y \pmod N$$

If one can solve factoring

⇓

Can break RSA



$m \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$?

What if $p \mid m$ (or $q \mid m$) ?

Correctness still holds.

Security: $p \mid (m^e \bmod N)$

$\Rightarrow \gcd(c, N) = p \Rightarrow$ break factoring!

$m \xleftarrow{\$} [1, N-1]$:

$$\Pr[p \mid m] \approx \frac{q}{N} = \frac{1}{p} = \frac{1}{2^{\theta(\lambda)}} = \text{negligible}(\lambda)$$

(p: $\theta(\lambda)$-bit)

If sending k messages:

$$\Pr[p \mid m \text{ for any } m] \leq \frac{k}{p}$$

($k \leftarrow \text{poly}(\lambda)$, $p \leftarrow 2^{\theta(\lambda)}$)

Group Theory

$\mathbb{Z}$ ↓ $+$ ↓

Def A group is a set G along with a binary operation $\circ$ with properties:

① **Closure**: $\forall g, h \in G, \quad g \circ h \in G$

② **Existence of an identity**: $\exists e \in G$ s.t. $\forall g \in G, \quad e \circ g = g \circ e = g$.

③ **Existence of inverse**: $\forall g \in G, \exists h \in G$ s.t. $g \circ h = h \circ g = e$

Inverse of g denoted as g^{-1}.

④ **Associativity**: $\forall g_1, g_2, g_3 \in G, \quad (g_1 \circ g_2) \circ g_3 = g_1 \circ (g_2 \circ g_3)$

We say a group is **abelian** if it satisfies:

⑤ **Commutativity**: $\forall g, h \in G, \quad g \circ h = h \circ g$

For a finite group, we use $|G|$ to denote its **order** (# of elements)

Group Theory

Ex. $(\mathbb{Z}, +)$ is an abelian group

$(\mathbb{Z}, \cdot)$ is not a group

$(\mathbb{Z}_N^*, \cdot)$ is an abelian group ($\cdot$ denotes multiplication mod N)

Def Let G be a group of order m.

Denote $\langle g \rangle = \{ g^0 (=e), g^1, g^2, \cdots, g^{m-1} \}$

G is a **cyclic group** if $\exists g \in G$ s.t. $\langle g \rangle = G$.

g is a generator of G.

Ex. $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ (for a prime p) is a cyclic group of order $p-1$.

$\mathbb{Z}_7^* = \{ 3^0 = 1, 3^1, 3^2 = 2, 3^3 = 6, 3^4 = 4, 3^5 = 5 \}$

How to find a generator? $g^\alpha = 1 \quad \alpha \mid (p-1)$

Diffie-Hellman Assumptions

Integer group key 2048-bit
Elliptic Curve group key 256-bit

$(G, q, g) \leftarrow G(1^\lambda)$ — $\Theta(\lambda)$-bit integer

cyclic group G of order q, with generator g. $G = \{g^0, g^1, \cdots, g^{q-1}\}$

- **Discrete Logarithm (DLOG) Assumption:** $\log_g h$

  $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$, compute $h = g^x$ $\quad g^x \overset{?}{\Rightarrow} x$

  Given (G, q, g, h), it's computationally hard to find x (classically).

  If one can solve DLOG → Solve CDH

- **Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption:**

  $x, y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$, compute $h_1 = g^x$, $h_2 = g^y$ $\quad (g^x, g^y) \overset{?}{\Rightarrow} g^{xy}$

  Given (G, q, g, h_1, h_2), it's computationally hard to find g^{xy}.

  Solve CDH → Solve DDH

- **Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption:**

  $x, y, z \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$, compute $h_1 = g^x$, $h_2 = g^y$

  Given (G, q, g, h_1, h_2), it's computationally hard to distinguish between $(g^x, g^y, g^{xy}) \overset{c}{\simeq} (g^x, g^y, g^z)$ g^{xy} and g^z.

ElGamal Encryption

- $Gen(1^\lambda)$:

  $(G, q, g) \leftarrow G(1^\lambda)$ ← can be re-used

  $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$, compute $h = g^x$

  $pk = (G, q, g, h)$ $\quad sk = x$

- $Enc_{pk}(m)$: $m \in G$

  $y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$

  $c = \langle g^y, h^y \cdot m \rangle$

  $h^y = g^{xy} \overset{c}{\simeq} g^z$

- $Dec_{sk}(c)$:

  $c = \langle c_1, c_2 \rangle$

  $c_1^x = (g^y)^x = g^{xy}$

  $\frac{c_2}{c_1^x} = \frac{g^{xy} \cdot m}{g^{xy}} = m$

Secure Key Exchange



Thm (Informal): It's impossible to construct secure key exchang from SKE in a black-box way.

Key Exchange from PKE?



Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

$(G, q, g) \leftarrow G(1^\lambda)$

$x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$, compute $h_A = g^x$

(G, q, g, h_A) →

$y \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$, compute $h_B = g^y$

← h_B

$k = h_B^x = g^{xy}$

$k = h_A^y = g^{xy}$

What happens in practice



Message Integrity



Message Integrity



Message Authentication Code (MAC)



Digital Signature



Syntax

Message Authentication Code (MAC) Scheme $\Pi = (Gen, Mac, Vrfy)$

$k \leftarrow Gen(1^\lambda)$

$t \leftarrow Mac_k(m)$

$0/1 := Vrfy_k(m, t)$

Digital Signature Scheme $\Pi = (Gen, Sign, Vrfy)$

$(sk, vk) \leftarrow Gen(1^\lambda)$

$\sigma \leftarrow Sign_{sk}(m)$

$0/1 := Vrfy_{vk}(m, \sigma)$

Chosen-Message Attack (CMA)



Constructions for MAC

From block cipher: CBC-MAC

From hash function: HMAC

Computational Assumption: "The construction is secure"

Constructions for Digital Signature

RSA Signature : RSA Assumption

DSA Signature : Discrete Logarithm Assumption

Lattice-Based Encryption Schemes (Post-Quantum Security)