


CSCI 1510

- Perfect ZKP for Diffie-Hellman Tuples (continued)
- Commitment Schemes
- ZKP for All NP
- Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs


Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)



Let (P, V) be a pair of PPT interactive machines. (P, V) is a zero-knowledge proof system for a language L with associated relation R_L if

- **Completeness:** $\forall (x, w) \in R_L. \Pr [P(x, w) \longleftrightarrow V(x) \text{ outputs } 1] = 1$.
- **Soundness:** $\forall x \notin L. \forall \overset{(PPT)}{\underset{\text{argument}}{\uparrow}} P^*, \Pr [P^*(x) \longleftrightarrow V(x) \text{ outputs } 1] \leq \text{negl}(n)$.
- **Zero-Knowledge?**

Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)



• **Zero-Knowledge:** $\forall \text{PPT } V^*, \exists \text{PPT } S \text{ s.t. } \forall (x, w) \in R_L,$

$$\text{Output}_{V^*} [P(x, w) \longleftrightarrow V^*(x)] \simeq S(x)$$

\uparrow
perfect/statistical/computational
 $\equiv \simeq^S \simeq^C$


Perfect ZKP for Diffie-Hellman Tuples

Input: Cyclic group G of order q , generator g , h, u, v

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \parallel & \parallel & \parallel \\ g^a & g^b & g^{ab} \end{array}$$

Witness: b

Statement: $\exists b \in \mathbb{Z}_q \text{ s.t. } u = g^b \wedge v = h^b$



Completeness ?


$$\begin{aligned} g^s &= g^{\sigma \cdot b + r} \\ &= (g^b)^\sigma \cdot g^r \\ &= u^\sigma \cdot A \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} h^s &= h^{\sigma \cdot b + r} \\ &= (h^b)^\sigma \cdot h^r \\ &= v^\sigma \cdot B \end{aligned}$$

Soundness? $(g, h, u, v) \in L$ $v = h^{b'}$ $b' \neq b$

$$\begin{array}{c} \parallel \\ g^a \\ \parallel \\ g^b \\ \parallel \\ g^c \end{array}$$

$\forall X \in L, \forall P^*, \Pr[P^*(x) \leftrightarrow V(x) \text{ outputs 1}] \leq \text{negl}(n)$



$$g^s = u^s \cdot A \Leftrightarrow g^s = (g^b)^s \cdot A \Leftrightarrow (g^s)^a = (g^b)^{s \cdot a} \cdot A^a \Leftrightarrow h^s = h^{b \cdot s} \cdot A^a$$


$$h^s = v^s \cdot B \Leftrightarrow h^s = (h^{b'})^s \cdot B$$

$$\Pr[g^s = u^s \cdot A \wedge h^s = v^s \cdot B] = \Pr[h^{b \cdot s} \cdot A^a = h^{b' \cdot s} \cdot B] = \Pr[h^{(b' - b) \cdot s} = B/A^a] \leq \frac{1}{2}$$


Zero-Knowledge?

$\forall \text{PPT } V^*, \exists \text{PPT } S \text{ s.t. } V(x, w) \in R_L,$

$$\text{Output}_{V^*}[P(x, w) \leftrightarrow V^*(x)] \equiv S(x)$$




ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring (All NP)




NP language $L = \{ G : G \text{ has 3-coloring} \}$

NP relation $R_L = \{ (G, 3\text{COL}) \}$



Commitment Scheme



Commitment Scheme

Def A non-interactive perfectly binding commitment scheme is a PPT algorithm Com satisfying:

- **Perfectly Binding:** $\forall r, s \in \{0, 1\}^n$, $\text{Com}(0; r) \neq \text{Com}(1; s)$
- **Computationally Hiding:** $\text{Com}(0; \text{Un}) \stackrel{\mathcal{C}}{\simeq} \text{Com}(1; \text{Un})$

A decommitment of a commitment value c is (b, r) s.t. $c = \text{Com}(b; r)$.

Can a commitment scheme be both perfectly binding & perfectly hiding?

Perfectly Binding Commitment Scheme

Assume one-way permutations exist.

Let $f: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ be a DWP and $hc: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ be a hard-core predicate of f .

$$\text{Com}(b; r) := (f(r), hc(r) \oplus b)$$

- Perfectly Binding?
- Computationally Hiding?

ZKP for Graph 3-Coloring

Input: $G = (V, E)$

Witness: $\phi: V \rightarrow \{0, 1, 2\}$

Given a perfectly binding commitment scheme Com .

Prover

Randomly sample $\pi: \{0, 1, 2\} \rightarrow \{0, 1, 2\}$

$\forall v \in V, r_v \in \{0, 1\}^n, c_v := \text{Com}(\pi(\phi(v)), r_v)$

Verifier

$\{c_v\}_{v \in V}$

Randomly pick an edge $(u, v) \in E$

$\xleftarrow{(u, v)}$

Reveal decommitments of c_u & c_v

$\frac{\alpha = \pi(\phi(u)), r_u}{\beta = \pi(\phi(v)), r_v}$

Verify: $c_u = \text{Com}(\alpha; r_u)$

$c_v = \text{Com}(\beta; r_v)$

$\alpha, \beta \in \{0, 1, 2\}, \alpha \neq \beta$

Completeness?

Soundness?

Zero-Knowledge?

$\forall \text{PPT } V^*, \exists \text{PPT } S \text{ s.t. } \forall (x, w) \in R_L,$

$\text{Output}_{V^*}[P(x, w) \leftrightarrow V^*(x)] \stackrel{?}{=} S(x)$

Simulator

Verifier*

$\{C_v\}_{v \in V}$



Randomly pick an edge $(u, v) \in E$



Reveal decommitments of C_u & C_v

α, r_u

β, r_v



Verify: $C_u = \text{Com}(\alpha; r_u)$

$C_v = \text{Com}(\beta; r_v)$

$\alpha, \beta \in \{0, 1, 2\}, \alpha \neq \beta$


Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) Proof



- **Completeness:** $\forall (x, w) \in R_L, \quad \Pr [P(x, w) \rightarrow V(x) \text{ outputs } 1] = 1$.
- **Soundness:** $\forall x \notin L, \forall P^*, \quad \Pr [P^*(x) \rightarrow V(x) \text{ outputs } 1] \leq \text{negl}(n)$
- **Zero-Knowledge:** $\forall \text{PPT } V^*, \exists \text{PPT } S \text{ s.t. } \forall (x, w) \in R_L,$
 $\text{Output}_{V^*}[P(x, w) \rightarrow V^*(x)] \simeq S(x)$

Is it possible?

Model 1: Common Random String / Common Reference String (CRS)




$S(x)$ generates both (σ, π)

- **Zero-Knowledge:** $\forall \text{PPT } V^*, \exists \text{PPT } S \text{ s.t. } \forall (x, w) \in R_L,$

$\text{Output}_{V^*}[\sigma \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n), P(x, w, \sigma) \rightarrow V^*(x, \sigma)] \simeq S(x)$

Alternatively: $(\sigma \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n), P(x, w, \sigma)) \simeq S(x)$


Model 2: Random Oracle Model



S controls input/output behavior of RO

Fiat-Shamir Heuristic

Public-Coin Honest-Verifier ZK ($HVZK$) \Rightarrow NIZK in the RO model



$$b_1 := H(x \parallel m_1)$$

$$b_2 := H(x \parallel m_1 \parallel m_2)$$