

CSCI 1510

This Lecture:

- Computational Security
- Concrete vs. Asymptotic
- Definition of Semantic Security


Last Lecture

Perfectly secure symmetric-key encryption

- Definitions 1, 2, 3

$\forall m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}, \forall c \in \mathcal{C}:$

$$\Pr[Enc_k(m_0) = c] = \Pr[Enc_k(m_1) = c]$$



- Construction: OTP
- Limitations: $|\mathcal{M}| \leq |\mathcal{K}|$.

How to relax the security definition?

Computational Security

Perfect Security:

- ① Absolutely no information is leaked
- ② A has unlimited computational power

Relaxation (Practical Purpose):

- ① "Tiny" information can be leaked
- ② A has limited computational power

How to formalize?

Computational Security

- Concrete Approach:

A scheme is (t, ϵ) -secure if $\forall A$ running in time $\leq t$ succeeds in breaking the scheme with probability $\leq \epsilon$.

classical computers ↓
CPU cycles ↓

Example: $(2^{128}, 2^{-80})$ -secure encryption scheme.

What's the problem?

Computational Security

- Asymptotic Approach:

Introduce a security parameter n (public)

measuring how "hard" it is for A to break the scheme.

All honest parties run in time $\text{poly}(n)$.

Security can be tuned by changing n .

$\text{poly}(n)$ "negligible" in n

A scheme is (t, ϵ) -secure if $\forall A$ running in time $\text{poly}(n)$ succeeds in breaking the scheme with probability $\text{negl}(n)$.

Polynomial & Negligible

"Efficient": probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)


Def A function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ is **polynomial** if
 $\exists c \in \mathbb{N}$ st. $f(n) \in O(n^c)$

Example: $f(n) = 3n^6 + 5n^2 - 7 \in O(n^6)$

Def A function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ is **negligible** if
 $\forall$ polynomial p , $\exists N \in \mathbb{N}$ st. $\forall n > N$, $f(n) < \frac{1}{p(n)}$.


$\Leftrightarrow \forall c \in \mathbb{N}$, $f(n) \in o(n^{-c})$

Examples: 2^{-n} , $2^{-\sqrt{n}}$, $n^{-\log n}$



Exercise: Is this a negligible function?

$$f(n) := \begin{cases} 2^{-n} & \text{if } n \text{ is even} \\ 1/n^2 & \text{if } n \text{ is odd} \end{cases}$$



Negligible Function

~~Def~~ A function $f: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+$ is negligible if

$$\forall \text{ polynomial } p, \exists N \in \mathbb{N} \text{ s.t. } \forall n > N, f(n) < \frac{1}{p(n)}.$$

Claim 1 If f, g are negligible functions, then $f+g$ is also negligible.

Claim 2 If f is negligible, p is polynomial, then $f \cdot p$ is also negligible.

Corollary If g is non-negligible, p is polynomial, then $\frac{g}{p}$ is also non-negligible.

Concrete $\rightarrow$ Asymptotic

A scheme is (t, ϵ) -secure if $\forall A$ running in time $\leq t$ succeeds in breaking the scheme with probability $\leq \epsilon$.



Security parameter n



$\text{poly}(n)$



A scheme is secure if $\forall$ PPT A succeeds in breaking the scheme with probability $\leq$ negligible.

$\uparrow$
 $\text{negl}(n)$

Computationally Secure Encryption

- **Syntax:**

A symmetric-key encryption scheme is defined by PPT algorithms

$(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$:

$$k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$$

$$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m) \quad m \in \{0,1\}^*$$

$$m/\perp := \text{Dec}_k(c)$$

$\underbrace{11 \dots 1}_n$

- **Correctness:** $\forall n, \forall k$ output by $\text{Gen}(1^n), \forall m \in \{0,1\}^*$

$$\text{Dec}_k(\text{Enc}_k(m)) = m$$


Computationally Secure Encryption

Def 1 A symmetric-key encryption scheme $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$

is **semantically secure** if $\forall \text{PPT } A, \exists \text{ negligible function } \epsilon(\cdot)$ s.t.

computationally
indistinguishable

$$\Pr[b = b'] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon(n)$$




Computationally Secure Encryption

Def 2 A symmetric-key encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec)

is **semantically secure** if $\forall$ PPT A , $\exists$ negligible function $\epsilon(\cdot)$ s.t.

computationally
indistinguishable

$$\left| \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 0] - \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon(n)$$



Computationally Secure Encryption

Def 1 A symmetric-key encryption scheme $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$

is **semantically secure** if $\forall \text{PPT } A$:



$$\Pr[b=b'] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n) \quad \text{in Game 1.}$$

Def 2 $\left| \Pr[b'=1 \mid b=0] - \Pr[b'=1 \mid b=1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(n)$ in Game 2.

Def 1 $\Rightarrow$ Def 2: If $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is secure under Def 1,
then Π is also secure under Def 2.