### CSCI-1680 Security

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Based on lecture notes by Scott Shenker, Mike Freedman, and Rodrigo Fonseca

### **Today's Lecture**

- Classes of attacks
- Basic security requirements
- Simple cryptographic methods
- Crypto toolkit (Hash, Digital Signature, ...)
- DNSSec (in .pptx, won't have time today)
- Certificate Authorities
- SSL / HTTPS



### **Basic Secure Communication Reqs**

- Availability: Will the network deliver data?
  - Infrastructure compromise, DDoS
- Authentication: Who is this actor?
  - Spoofing, phishing
- Integrity: Do messages arrive in original form?
- Confidentiality: Can adversary read the data?
  - Sniffing, man-in-the-middle
- **Provenance:** Who is responsible for this data?
  - Forging responses, denying responsibility
  - Not who sent the data, but who created it



### **Other Desirable Security Properties**

- Authorization: is actor allowed to do this action?
  - Access controls
- Accountability/Attribution: who did this activity?
- Audit/Forensics: what occurred in the past?
  - A broader notion of accountability/attribution
- Appropriate use: is action consistent with policy?
  - E.g., no spam; no games during business hours; etc.
- Freedom from traffic analysis: can someone tell when I am sending and to whom?
- Anonymity: can someone tell I sent this packet?




### **Internet's Design: Insecure**

- Designed for simplicity in a naïve era
- "On by default" design
- Readily available zombie machines
- Attacks look like normal traffic
- Internet's federated operation obstructs cooperation for diagnosis/mitigation



### Eavesdropping - Message Interception (Attack on Confidentiality)

- Unauthorized access to information
- Packet sniffers and wiretappers
- Illicit copying of files and programs





# Eavesdropping Attack: Example

 tcpdump with promiscuous network interface


- On a switched network, what can you see?

- What might the following traffic types reveal about communications?
  - DNS lookups (and replies)
  - IP packets without payloads (headers only)
  - Payloads



### **Integrity Attack - Tampering**


- Stop the flow of the message
- Delay and optionally modify the message
- Release the message again





### **Authenticity Attack - Fabrication**


- Unauthorized assumption of other's identity
- Generate and distribute messages under this identity
- Special case replay attack





### Attack on Availability

- Destroy hardware (cutting fiber) or software
- Modify software in a subtle way
- Corrupt packets in transit



- Blatant denial of service (DoS):
  - Crashing the server
  - Overwhelm the server (use up its resource)
  - Special case: Distributed Denial of Service (DDos)



### **Basic Forms of Cryptography**



### **Confidentiality through Cryptography**

- **Cryptography:** communication over insecure channel in the presence of adversaries
- Studied for thousands of years
- Central goal: how to encode information so that an adversary can't extract it ...but a friend can
- General premise: a key is required for decoding
  - Give it to friends, keep it away from attackers

#### Two different categories of encryption

- Symmetric: efficient, requires key distribution
- Asymmetric (Public Key): simplifies key distribution, but more computationally expensive



# Symmetric Key Encryption

#### • Same key for encryption and decryption

- Both sender and receiver know key
- But adversary does not know key

#### • For communication, problem is key distribution

- How do the parties (secretly) agree on the key?

#### • What can you do with a huge key? One-time pad

- Huge key of random bits


#### To encrypt/decrypt: just XOR with the key!

- Provably secure! .... provided:
  - You never reuse the key ... and it really is random
- Spies actually use these



### **Using Symmetric Keys**

 Both the sender and the receiver use the same secret keys





# Asymmetric Encryption (Public Key)

- Idea: use two *different* keys, one to encrypt (e) and one to decrypt (d)
  - A key pair
- Crucial property: knowing e does not tell you d
- Therefore e can be public: everyone knows it!
- If Alice wants to send to Bob, she fetches Bob's public key (say from Bob's home page) and encrypts with it
  - <u>Alice</u> can't decrypt what she's sending to Bob ...
  - ... but then, <u>neither can anyone else</u> (except Bob)




### **Public Key / Asymmetric Encryption**

- Sender uses receiver's public key
  - Advertised to everyone


#### Receiver uses complementary private key

- Must be kept secret



### **Works in Reverse Direction Too!**

- Sender signs his own private key
- Receiver verifies with public key
- Allows sender to prove he knows private key



### **Realizing Public Key Cryptography**

### Invented in the 1970s

- *Revolutionized* cryptography

- (Was actually invented earlier by British intelligence)
- How can we construct an encryption/ decryption algorithm with public/private properties?

– Answer: Number Theory

### Most fully developed approach: RSA

- Rivest / Shamir / Adleman, 1977; RFC 3447
- Based on modular multiplication of very large integers
- -Very widely used (e.g., SSL/TLS for https)



#### • RSA:

- assumes it is difficult to factor a large integer with two large prime factors
- Elliptic Curve:
  - discrete logarithm of a random elliptic curve in a finite field
- CS166 Introduction to Computer Systems Security
- CS151 Introduction to Cryptography and Computer Security



### **Cryptographic Toolkit**



### Cryptographic Toolkit

- Confidentiality: Encryption
- Integrity: ?
- Authentication: ?
- Provenance: ?




# Integrity: Cryptographic Hashes

- Sender computes a *digest* of message *m*, i.e., *H(m)*
  - H() is a publicly known hash function
- Send *m* in any manner
- Send digest d = H(m) to receiver in a secure way:
  - Using another physical channel
  - Using encryption (why does this help?)
- Upon receiving *m* and *d*, receiver re-computes *H(m)* to see whether result agrees with *d*



### **Operation of Hashing for Integrity**






# Cryptographically Strong Hashes

- Hard to invert
  - Given hash, adversary can't find input that produces it
  - Allows oblique reference to private objects (e.g., passwords)
    - · Send hash of object rather than object itself
- Hard to find collisions
  - Adversary can't find two inputs that produce same hash
  - So can't alter message without modifying digest
  - Allows succinct reference to large objects (e.g. BitTorrent blocks)
- Here, "Can't" means "Thought to be computationally infeasible"



### **Effects of Cryptographic Hashing**





### Cryptographic Toolkit

- Confidentiality: Encryption
- Integrity: Cryptographic Hash
- Authentication: ?
- Provenance: ?




### **Public Key Authentication**

 Each side only needs to know the other side's public key

- No secret key need be shared

- A encrypts a nonce (random number) x using B's public key
- B proves it can recover x
- A can authenticate itself to B in the same way





### **Cryptographic Toolkit**

- Confidentiality: Encryption
- Integrity: Cryptographic Hash
- Authentication: Decrypting nonce
- Provenance: ?




## **Digital Signatures**

- Suppose Alice has published public key K<sub>E</sub>
- If she wishes to prove who she is, she can send a message *x* encrypted with her private key K<sub>D</sub>
  - Therefore: anyone w/ public key K<sub>E</sub> can recover x, verify that Alice must have sent the message
  - It provides a digital signature
  - Alice can't deny it later  $\Rightarrow$  non-repudiation
    - Well, she could claim her key was compromised



### RSA Crypto & Signatures, con't





# Summary of Our Crypto Toolkit

- If we can securely distribute a key, then
  - Symmetric ciphers (e.g., AES) offer fast, presumably strong confidentiality
- Public key cryptography does away with problem of secure key distribution
  - But not as computationally efficient
  - Often addressed by using public key crypto to exchange a session key
  - Not guaranteed secure
    - But it would be a **major** result if it isn't



# Summary of Our Crypto Toolkit, con't

- Cryptographically strong hash functions provide major building block for integrity (e.g., SHA-1)
  - As well as providing concise digests
  - And providing a way to prove you know something (e.g., passwords) without revealing it (non-invertibility)
  - But: worrisome recent results regarding their strength
- Public key also gives us signatures
  - Including sender non-repudiation
- Turns out there's a crypto trick based on similar algorithms that allows two parties who don't know each other's public key to securely negotiate a secret key even in the presence of eavesdroppers Diffie-Hellman exchange



### **PKIs and HTTPS**



### Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

- Public key crypto is *very* powerful ...
- ... but the realities of tying public keys to real world identities turn out to be quite hard
- PKI: *Trust distribution* mechanism
  - Authentication via Digital Certificates
- Trust doesn't mean someone is honest, just that they are who they say they are...



### Managing Trust

- The most solid level of trust is rooted in our direct personal experience
  - E.g., Alice's trust that Bob is who they say they are
  - Clearly doesn't scale to a global network!
- In its absence, we rely on *delegation* 
  - Alice trusts Bob's identity because Charlie attests to it
  - .... and Alice trusts Charlie

. . . .



# Managing Trust, con't

- Trust is not particularly transitive
  - Should Alice trust Bob because she trusts Charlie ...
  - … and Charlie vouches for Donna …
  - … and Donna says Eve is trustworthy …
  - … and Eve vouches for Bob's identity?

### Two models of delegating trust

- Rely on your set of friends and their friends
  - "Web of trust" -- e.g., PGP
- Rely on trusted, well-known authorities (and their minions)
  - "Trusted root" -- e.g., HTTPS




# **PKI Conceptual Framework**

#### • Trusted-Root PKI:

- Basis: well-known public key serves as root of a hierarchy
- Managed by a Certificate Authority (CA)
- To publish a public key, ask the CA to digitally sign a statement indicating that they agree ("certify") that it is indeed your key
  - This is a certificate for your key (certificate = bunch of bits)
    - Includes both your public key and the signed statement
  - Anyone can verify the signature
- Delegation of trust to the CA
  - They'd better not screw up (duped into signing bogus key)
  - They'd better have procedures for dealing with stolen keys
  - Note: can build up a hierarchy of signing



#### **Components of a PKI**





# **Digital Certificate**



# Signed data structure that binds an entity with its corresponding public key

- Signed by a *recognized* and *trusted* authority, i.e., Certification Authority (CA)
- Provide assurance that a particular public key belongs to a specific entity
- Example: certificate of entity Y Cert = E({name<sub>Y</sub>, KY<sub>public</sub>}, KCA<sub>private</sub>)
  - KCA<sub>private</sub>: private key of Certificate Authority
  - name<sub>Y</sub>: name of entity Y
  - KY<sub>public</sub>: public key of entity Y
    - In fact, they may sign whatever glob of bits you give them
- Your browser has a bunch of CAs wired into it




#### **Certification Authority**



- People, processes responsible for creation, delivery and management of digital certificates
- Organized in an hierarchy
  - To verify signature chain, follow hierarchy up to root







## **Registration Authority**

People & processes responsible for:



- Authenticating the identity of new entities (users or computing devices), e.g.,
  - By phone, or physical presence + ID
- Issuing requests to CA for certificates
- The CA must trust the Registration
  Authority
  - This trust can be misplaced



# **Certificate Repository**

- A database accessible to all users of a PKI
- Contains:
  - Digital certificates
  - Policy information associated with certs
  - Certificate revocation information
    - Vital to be able to identify certs that have been compromised
    - Usually done via a *revocation list*



Certificate Repository


# HTTPS

- After clicking https://www.amazon.com
- https = "Use HTTP over SSL/TLS"
  - SSL = Secure Socket Layer
  - TLS = Transport Layer Security
    - Successor to SSL, and compatible with it
  - RFC 4346
- Provides security layer (authentication, encryption) on top of TCP
  - Fairly transparent to the app



#### **HTTPS Connection (SSL/TLS), con't**

- Browser (client) connects via TCP to Amazon's HTTPS server
- Client sends over list of crypto protocols it supports
- Server picks protocols to use for this session
- Server sends over its certificate
- (all of this is in the clear)



#### **Inside the Server's Certificate**

- Name associated with cert (e.g., Amazon)
- Amazon's public key
- A bunch of auxiliary info (physical address, type of cert, expiration time)
- URL to revocation center to check for revoked keys
- Name of certificate's signatory (who signed it)
- A public-key signature of a hash of all this
  - Constructed using the signatory's private RSA key




# Validating Amazon's Identity

- Browser retrieves cert belonging to the signatory
  - These are hardwired into the browser
- If it can't find the cert, then warns the user that site has not been verified
  - And may ask whether to continue
  - Note, can still proceed, just without authentication
- Browser uses public key in signatory's cert to decrypt signature
  - Compares with its own hash of Amazon's cert
- Assuming signature matches, now have high confidence it's indeed Amazon ...
  - ... assuming signatory is trustworthy



#### **HTTPS Connection (SSL/TLS), con't**


- Browser constructs a random session key K
- Browser encrypts K using Amazon's public key
- Browser sends E(K, KA<sub>public</sub>) to server
- Browser displays
- All subsequent communication encrypted w/ symmetric cipher using key K
  - E.g., client can authenticate using a password





#### **DNS Security**







Source: http://nsrc.org/tutorials/2009/apricot/dnssec/dnssec-tutorial.pdf

#### **Root level DNS attacks**

#### • Feb. 6, 2007:

- Botnet attack on the 13 Internet DNS root servers
- Lasted 2.5 hours
- None crashed, but two performed badly:
  - g-root (DoD), I-root (ICANN)
  - Most other root servers use anycast



# Do you trust the TLD operators?

- Wildcard DNS record for all <u>.com</u> and <u>.net</u> domain names not yet registered by others
  - September 15 October 4, 2003
  - February 2004: Verisign sues ICANN
- Redirection for these domain names to Verisign web portal: "to help you search"

and serve you ads...and get "sponsored" search



## **Defense: Replication and Caching**


Letter	Old name	Operator	Location
Α	ns.internic.net	VeriSign	Dulles, Virginia, USA
В	ns1.isi.edu	ISI	Marina Del Rey, California, USA
с	c.psi.net	Cogent Communications	distributed using anycast
D	terp.umd.edu	University of Maryland	College Park, Maryland, USA
Е	ns.nasa.gov	NASA	Mountain View, California, USA
F	ns.isc.org	ISC	distributed using anycast
G	ns.nic.ddn.mil	U.S. DoD NIC	Columbus, Ohio, USA
н	aos.arl.army.mil	U.S. Army Research Lab 🔒	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, USA
I	nic.nordu.net	Autonomica 🗗	distributed using anycast
J		VeriSign	distributed using anycast
к		RIPE NCC	distributed using anycast
L		ICANN	Los Angeles, California, USA
м		WIDE Project	distributed using anycast



source: wikipedia

#### **DNS Amplification Attack**


DNS Amplification attack: ( ×40 amplification )



580,000 open resolvers on Internet (Kaminsky-Shiffman'06)



# **Solutions**





#### But should we believe it? Enter DNSSEC

- DNSSEC protects against data spoofing and corruption
- DNSSEC also provides mechanisms to authenticate servers and requests
- DNSSEC provides mechanisms to establish authenticity and integrity




# **PK-DNSSEC (Public Key)**

- The DNS servers sign the hash of resource record set with its private (signature) keys
- Public keys can be used to verify the SIGs
- Leverages hierarchy:
  - Authenticity of nameserver's public keys is established by a signature over the keys by the parent's private key
  - In ideal case, only roots' public keys need to be distributed out-of-band



## Verifying the tree

#### Question: www.cnn.com ?





#### **Next Class**

- Some new trends, Software-Defined Networking
- Second-to-last class!

