


CSCI 1510

This Lecture:

- Schnorr's Identification / Signature Schemes (Continued)
- Definition of Zero-Knowledge Proofs
- Perfect ZKP for Diffie-Hellman Tuples

Signatures from DLOG



Identification Scheme

Alice



(sk)

Bob




(pk)



Indeed Alice!


Special 3-Round Identification Scheme




Correctness: If both parties follow the protocol description, then the verifier accepts with probability 1.

Special 3-Round Identification Scheme

Def A 3-round identification scheme $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, P_1, P_2, V)$ is **secure** if $\forall \text{PPT } A$,
 $\exists$ negligible function $\varepsilon(\cdot)$ s.t. $\Pr[V(pk, r^*, s^*) = I^*] \leq \varepsilon(n)$.



Schnorr's Identification Scheme



$$h^r = (g^x)^r = g^{xr}$$
$$g^S = g^{xr+y}$$
$$g^S / h^r = g^y = I$$

Thm If DLOG is hard relative to G , then this is a secure identification scheme.

Proof Sketch C

DLOG

B

(G, g, q, h) →

$$\begin{aligned}s &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \\ r &\leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \\ I &:= g^s / h^r\end{aligned}$$

ID Scheme

A

(G, g, q, h) →

← "Transcript"
→
(I, r, s) →

$r^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
← I^*
→ r'
→ r^*

Rewind
 $r' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
← "Transcript"
→
(I, r, s) →

← Output s^*
← Output s'

$$\begin{aligned}g^{s^*} / h^{r^*} &= I^* \\ g^{s'} / h^{r'} &= I^* \Rightarrow g^{s^*} / h^{r^*} = g^{s'} / h^{r'} \\ g^{s^* - s'} &= h^{r^* - r'} \\ h &= g^{(s^* - s')(r^* - r')^{-1}}\end{aligned}$$

Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)

Alice



Bob



[There is a bug in your code]

[I have the secret key
for this ciphertext]

[There is enough balance
in my Bitcoin account]

[  have different colors]

What is a proof?

What does zero-knowledge mean?

Example: Red & Green Balls

Alice



[○ ○ have different colors]

(Color-blind)


Bob



$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$

If $b=0$: ○ ○

If $b=1$: ○ ○



If statement is true: $\Pr[b=b'] = 1$

If statement is false: $\Pr[b=b'] = (1/2)^n$

What is a "proof system"?


Statement: _____
proof: _____

_____ □

- **Completeness:** If statement is true, then $\exists$ proof that proves it's true.
- **Soundness:** If statement is false, then $\forall$ proof can't prove it's true.

NP as a Proof System

Example: Graph 3-coloring



NP language $L = \{ G : G \text{ has 3-coloring} \}$

NP relation $R_L = \{ (G, 3COL) \}$
graph 3-coloring

Statement: graph G


Proof: 3-coloring of G : 3COL

$(G, 3COL) \in R_L$


NP as a Proof System

A language L is in NP if $\exists$ poly-time V s.t.

- **Completeness:** $\forall x \in L, \exists w$ st. $V(x, w) = 1$
↑
witness
- **Soundness:** $\forall x \notin L, \forall w^*, V(x, w^*) = 0$




Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)



Let (P, V) be a pair of PPT interactive machines. (P, V) is a **zero-knowledge proof system** for a language L with associated relation R_L if

- **Completeness:** $\forall (x, w) \in R_L, \Pr [P(x, w) \longleftrightarrow V(x) \text{ outputs } 1] = 1.$
- **Soundness:** $\forall x \notin L, \forall \text{ (PPT) } P^*, \Pr [P^*(x) \longleftrightarrow V(x) \text{ outputs } 1] \leq \text{negl}(n).$
↑
argument
- **Zero-Knowledge?**

Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP)



• **Zero-Knowledge:** $\forall \text{PPT } V^*, \exists \text{PPT } S \text{ s.t. } \forall (x, w) \in R,$

$$\text{Output}_{V^*}[P(x, w) \longleftrightarrow V^*(x)] \simeq S(x)$$


$\uparrow$
 perfect / statistical / computational
 $\equiv \quad \simeq \quad \stackrel{c}{\simeq}$

Perfect ZKP for Diffie-Hellman Tuples

Input: Cyclic group G of order q , generator g , h , u , v
 g^a g^b g^{ab}

Witness: b

Statement: $\exists b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ s.t. $u = g^b \wedge v = h^b$




Completeness ?

$$\begin{aligned} g^S &= g^{\sigma \cdot b + r} \\ &= (g^b)^\sigma \cdot g^r \\ &= u^\sigma \cdot A \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} h^S &= h^{\sigma \cdot b + r} \\ &= (h^b)^\sigma \cdot h^r \\ &= v^\sigma \cdot B \end{aligned}$$

Soundness? $(g, \underset{g^a}{h}, \underset{g^b}{u}, \underset{g^c}{v}) \notin L$ $v = h^{b'}$ $b' \neq b$

$\forall x \notin L, \forall P^*, \Pr[P^*(x) \longleftrightarrow V(x) \text{ outputs } 1] \leq \text{negl}(n)$



$$g^S = u^\delta \cdot A \Leftrightarrow g^S = (g^b)^\delta \cdot A \Leftrightarrow (g^S)^a = (g^b)^{\delta \cdot a} \cdot A^a \Leftrightarrow h^S = h^{b \cdot \delta} \cdot A^a$$

$$h^S = v^\delta \cdot B \Leftrightarrow h^S = (h^{b'})^\delta \cdot B$$

$$\Pr[g^S = u^\delta \cdot A \wedge h^S = v^\delta \cdot B] = \Pr[h^{b \cdot \delta} \cdot A^a = h^{b' \cdot \delta} \cdot B] = \Pr[h^{(b-b') \cdot \delta} = B/A^a] \leq \frac{1}{2}$$

Zero-Knowledge?

$\forall$ PPT V^* , $\exists$ PPT S s.t. $\forall (x, w) \in R_L$,
 $\text{Output}_{V^*}[P(x, w) \leftrightarrow V^*(x)] \equiv S(x)$

Simulator

$r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$

$A := g^r, B := h^r \rightarrow$

$\leftarrow c$

$S := c \cdot b + r \bmod q \rightarrow$

Verifier*

$c \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$