

# CSCI 1510

- Program Obfuscation (continued)
- Final Review

**ANNOUNCEMENT:** Course Feedback & Critical Review

# Program Obfuscation

Alice



P (program)



Obfuscate



$\tilde{P}$

```
int E,L,O,R,G[42][m],h[2][42][m],g[3][8],c
[42][42][2],f[42]; char d[42]; void v( int
b,int a,int j){ printf("\33[%d;%df\33[4%d"
"m ",a,b,j); } void u(){ int T,e; n(42)o(
e,m)if(h[0][T][e]-h[1][T][e]){ v(e+4+e,T+2
,h[0][T][e]+1?h[0][T][e]:0); h[1][T][e]=h[
0][T][e]; } fflush(stdout); } void q(int l
,int k,int p){
int T,e,a; L=0
; O=1; while(O
){ n(4&&L){ e=
k+c[l] [T][0];
h[0][L-1+c[l]][
T][1]][p?20-e:
```

Bob



$\tilde{P}$





$\tilde{P}(x) \rightarrow y$

$P = ?$

**Goal:** Make the program "unintelligible" without affecting its functionality.

# Symmetric-Key to Public-Key



## Formal Definition: Virtual Black Box (VBB)


Obfuscator  $O$ :  $C \xrightarrow{O} O(C)$

• **Functionality:**  $O(C)$  computes the same function as  $C$ .

• **Polynomial Slowdown:**  $|O(C)| \leq \text{poly}(n) \cdot |C|$

• **Security (Virtual Black Box):**

$\forall$  PPT  $A$ ,  $\exists$  PPT  $S$ , s.t.  $\forall C$ ,  $A(O(C)) \stackrel{c}{\approx} S^{C(\cdot)}(1^{|C|})$ .



Thm VBB obfuscator for all poly-sized circuits is impossible to achieve.


$$C(x) := \begin{cases} b & \text{if } x=a \\ m & \text{if } x(a)=b \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Run  $O(C) (O(C)) \rightarrow m$

## Formal Definition: Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO)

Obfuscator  $O$ :  $C \xrightarrow{O} O(C)$

- **Functionality**:  $O(C)$  computes the same function as  $C$ .
- **Polynomial Slowdown**:  $|O(C)| \leq \text{poly}(n) \cdot |C|$
- **Security (indistinguishability obfuscation)**:  
If  $C_0$  &  $C_1$  compute the same function and  $|C_0| = |C_1|$ ,  
then  $O(C_0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} O(C_1)$
- **Best Possible Obfuscation**



## PKE from iO

Let  $G: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2n}$  be a length-doubling PRG.

•  $\text{Gen}(1^n)$ :

$$sk \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$$


$$pk := G(sk)$$

•  $\text{Enc}_{pk}(m)$ :

$$C_{pk,m}(x) := \begin{cases} m & \text{if } G(x) = pk \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Output  $c \leftarrow \text{iO}(C_{pk,m})$

•  $\text{Dec}_{sk}(c)$ :  $c(sk) \rightarrow m$



Thm If  $G$  is a PRG and  $\text{iO}(\cdot)$  is an indistinguishability obfuscator, then this PKE scheme is CPA-secure.

$\mathcal{H}_0:$   $sk \in \{0,1\}^n$

$pk := G(sk)$

PRG  
↑  
↓

$C_{pk,m}(x) := \begin{cases} m & \text{if } G(x) = pk \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Output  $c \leftarrow \text{iD}(C_{pk,m})$

$\mathcal{H}_1:$   $pk \in \{0,1\}^{2n}$

Stat. close  
↑  
↓

$C_{pk,m}(x) := \begin{cases} m & \text{if } G(x) = pk \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Output  $c \leftarrow \text{iD}(C_{pk,m})$

$\mathcal{H}_2:$   $pk \in \{0,1\}^{2n}$

$C'_{pk,m}(x) := \perp$

Output  $c \leftarrow \text{iD}(C'_{pk,m})$

$\text{iD}(C'_{pk,m_0}) \stackrel{c}{\cong} \text{iD}(C'_{pk,m_1})$

## Is it possible?

- 2001: Notion introduced
- 2013: First "candidate" construction from multilinear maps
- 2013-2020: Attack, fixes, new constructions from new assumptions
- 2020: New construction from well-founded assumptions

# Final Review

- Cryptographic Hardness Assumptions
  - Factoring / RSA Assumptions
  - DLOG / CDH / DDH Assumptions
  - LWE Assumption (Post-Quantum)
  
- Key Exchange
  - Definition
  - Construction: Diffie-Hellman
  
- Public-Key Encryption
  - Definition: CPA / CCA
  - Constructions: El Gamal / RSA / Regev

# Final Review

- Theoretical Assumptions
  - One-Way Function / Permutation: Definition & Candidates
  - Hard-Core Predicate: Definition & Construction
  - PRG / PRF from OWP
  - Trapdoor Permutation: Definition & Candidate (RSA)
  - PKE from TDP
- Fully Homomorphic Encryption
  - Definition & Applications
  - Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption over Integers & from LWE (GSW)
  - Bootstrapping SWHE to FHE

# Final Review

- Digital Signature
  - Definition
  - Hash-and-Sign Paradigm
  - Construction 1: RSA-FDH
  - Proof in the Random Oracle Model
  - Construction 2: Schnorr
  - Identification Scheme: Definition & Construction from DLOG (Schnorr)
  - Fiat-Shamir Transform

## Final Review

- Zero-Knowledge Proof
  - Definition: Completeness / Soundness / Zero-Knowledge
  - Example: ZKP for Diffie-Hellman Tuples
  - Proof Technique: Rewinding
  - ZKP for All NP (Graph 3-Coloring)
  - Commitment Scheme
  - Non-Interactive ZK

# Final Review

- Secure Multi-Party Computation
  - Definition: Semi-Honest / Malicious
  - Applications
  - Example: Private Set Intersection from DDH
  - MPC for Any Function (GMW)
  - Oblivious Transfer: Definition & Construction from CDH
- Program Obfuscation
  - Definitions: VBB / iO
  - Example: PKE from iO

THANK YOU 😊