Although we'll be talking today about Williams' critique of what Smart calls "act utilitarianism" (Williams' "direct consequentialism"), the long history of utilitarian thinking has given rise to a variety of consequentialist methods of evaluating right and wrong. Whereas the classical utilitarian is committed to the view that an act is morally right or wrong because of the consequences of that act in itself, there are distinctions to be made in thinking about consequences that allow for consequentialist positions that are not (classically) utilitarian. Here, for example, is a list of several varieties of consequentialism from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on consequences (as opposed to circumstances or anything that happens before the act).Actual Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on the actual consequences (as opposed to foreseen, foreseeable, intended, or likely consequences).
Direct Consequentialism = whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act itself (as opposed to the consequences of the agent's motive, of a rule or practice that covers other acts of the same kind, and so on).
Evaluative Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the value of the consequences (as opposed to other features of the consequences).
Hedonism = the value of the consequences depends only on the pleasures and pains in the consequences (as opposed to other goods, such as freedom, knowledge, life, and so on).
Maximizing Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on which consequences are best (as opposed to satisfactory or an improvement over the status quo).
Aggregative Consequentialism = which consequences are best is some function of the values of parts of those consequences (as opposed to rankings of whole worlds or sets of consequences).
Total Consequentialism = moral rightness depends only on the total net good in the consequences (as opposed to the average net good per person).
Universal Consequentialism = moral rightness depends on the consequences for all people or sentient beings (as opposed to only the individual agent, present people, or any other limited group).
Equal Consideration = in determining moral rightness, benefits to one person matter just as much as similar benefits to any other person (= all who count, count equally).
Agent-neutrality = whether some consequences are better than others does not depend on whether the consequences are evaluated from the perspective of the agent (as opposed to an observer).
"A Critique of Utilitarianism," by Bernard Williams
In order to get into our discussion of Williams' essay quickly, and to give you a sense of how one might analyze his essay were this a class on ethics per se, we'll start with the following exam questions (of which there happen to be exactly 8!) taken from Richard Lee's "Contemporary Ethical Theory" course at the University of Arkansas:
1. What does Bernard Williams mean by "negative responsibility?" Is the doctrine of negative responsibility correct? Critically discuss.2. Explain the details either of Bernard Williams' "George's job prospect" example or of his "Jim and the Indians" example in his critique of utilitarianism. What kind of consideration, according to Williams, does a utilitarian analysis of Williams' "George" and "Jim" examples leave out which ought not be left out? How can utilitarianism best be defended against Williams' critique? Critically discuss.
3. Explain the details of Bernard Williams' "Jim and the Indians" example. What should Jim do in these circumstances? Why? Explore answers that might be given by various ethical theories or principles.
4. Bernard Williams writes "Now there is one version of this effect in which, for a utilitarian, some confusion must be involved, namely that in which the agent feels bad, his subsequent conduct and relations are crippled and so on, because he thinks that he has done the wrong thing ..." What is Williams talking about here? What does he think the confusion is? Is there a confusion here? Is he right?
5. Bernard Williams talks about "the `squeamishness' appeal." What does he mean by this? What does it have to do with utilitarianism? What does Williams have to say about it? Is he right?
6. Bernard Williams considers "a racial minority," which "does no particular harm," but such that "the other citizens have such prejudice that they find the sight of this group, even the knowledge of its presence, very disagreeable." What point is Williams trying to make with this example? Does it show what Williams thinks it shows?
7. What does Bernard Williams mean by "integrity" and how is this, on his view, relevant to morality? Is he right? Critically discuss.
8. To a decision that utilitarianism suggests is correct, Bernard Williams asks "But what if it conflicts with some project of mine?" What moral relevance does such conflict have? What does Williams think here?
Finally, we'll discuss whether or not the approaches of Smart and Williams are undermined or made more difficult if one adopts a "posthuman" perspective consistent with Hayles. For example, to what extent do the arguments of Smart and Williams depend on a "liberal subject" that may have already vanished in a posthuman era?
On Thursday, we'll return to Langford's book, reading the last two chapters, and discussing issues from all the chapters in light of our thinking about ethics from a philosophical/utilitarian point of view?
For Thursday:: Read chapters 9 and 10 of Langford's Internet Ethics