Trusted Multiplexing of Cryptographic Protocols

Jay McCarthy, Shriram Krishnamurthi

Formal Aspects of Security and Trust, 2009

Abstract

We present an analysis that determines when it is possible to multiplex a pair of cryptographic protocols. We present a transformation that improves the coverage of this analysis on common protocol formulations. We discuss the gap between the merely possible and the pragmatic through an optimization that informs a multiplexer. We also address the security ramifications of trusting external parties for this task and evaluate our work on a large repository of cryptographic protocols. We have formally verified this work using the Coq proof assistant.

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