CSCI-1680 DNS

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Based partly on lecture notes by Scott Shenker and John Jannotti

Host names and IP Addresses

• Host names

- Mnemonics appreciated by humans
- Variable length, ASCII characters
- Provide little (if any) information about location
- Examples: <u>www.cs.brown.edu</u>, bbc.co.uk
- IP Addresses
 - Numerical address appreciated by routers
 - Fixed length, binary numbers
 - Hierarchical, related to host location (in the network)
 - Examples: 128.148.32.110, 212.58.224.138



Separating Naming and Addressing

- Names are easier to remember
 - www.cnn.com vs 157.166.224.26
- Addresses can change underneath
 - e.g, renumbering when changing providers

• Name could map to multiple addresses

- www.cnn.com maps to at least 6 ip addresses
- Enables
 - Load balancing
 - Latency reduction
 - Tailoring request based on requester's location/device/identity
- Multiple names for the same address
 - Aliases: www.cs.brown.edu and cs.brown.edu
 - Multiple servers in the same node (e.g., apache virtual servers)



Scalable Address <-> Name Mappings

• Originally kept in a local file, hosts.txt

- Flat namespace
- Central administrator kept master copy (for the Internet)
- To add a host, emailed admin
- Downloaded file regularly

• Completely impractical today

- File would be huge (gigabytes)
- Traffic implosion (lookups and updates)
 - Some names change mappings every few days (dynamic IP)
- Single point of failure
- Impractical politics (repeated names, ownership, etc...)



Goals for an Internet-scale name system

• Scalability

- Must handle a huge number of records
 - With some software synthesizing names on the fly
- Must sustain update and lookup load

Distributed Control

- Let people control their own names
- Fault Tolerance
 - Minimize lookup failures in face of other network problems



The good news

- Properties that make these goals easier to achieve
 - 1. Read-mostly database

Lookups MUCH more frequent than updates


2. Loose consistency

When adding a machine, not end of the world if it takes minutes or hours to propagate

- These suggest aggressive caching
 - Once you've lookup up a hostname, remember
 - Don't have to look again in the near future




Domain Name System (DNS)



- Hierarchical namespace broken into zones
 - root (.), edu., brown.edu., cs.brown.edu.,
 - Zones separately administered :: delegation
 - Parent zone tells you how to find servers for subdomains
- Each zone served from multiple replicated servers



DNS Architecture



- Hierarchy of DNS servers
 - Root servers
 - Top-level domain (TLD) servers
 - Authoritative DNS servers


• Performing the translation

- Local DNS servers
- Resolver software



Resolver operation


- Apps make recursive queries to local DNS server (1)
 - Ask server to get answer for you
- Server makes iterative queries to remote servers (2,4,6)
 - Ask servers who to ask next
 - Cache results aggressively





DNS Root Server


- Located in Virginia, USA
- How do we make the root scale?





DNS Root Servers

- 13 Root Servers (www.root-servers.org)
 - Labeled A through M (e.g, A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET)
- Does this scale?



DNS Root Servers

- 13 Root Servers (www.root-servers.org)
 - Labeled A through M (e.g, A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET)
- Replication via anycasting



TLD and Authoritative DNS Servers

• Top Level Domain (TLD) servers

- Generic domains (e.g., com, org, edu)
- Country domains (e.g., uk, br, tv, in, ly)
- Special domains (e.g., arpa)
- Typically managed professionally
- Authoritative DNS servers
 - Provides public records for hosts at an organization
 - e.g, for the organization's own servers (www, mail, etc)
 - Can be maintained locally or by a service provider



Reverse Mapping

- How do we get the other direction, IP address to name?
- Addresses have a natural hierarchy:
 - 128.148.34.7
- But, most significant element comes first
- Idea: reverse the numbers: 7.34.148.128 ...
 - and look that up in DNS
- Under what TLD?
 - Convention: in-addr.arpa
 - Lookup 7.34.148.128.in-addr.arpa
 - in6.arpa for IPv6



DNS Caching

• All these queries take a long time!

- And could impose tremendous load on root servers
- This latency happens before any real communication, such as downloading your web page

• Caching greatly reduces overhead

- Top level servers very rarely change
- Popular sites visited often
- Local DNS server caches information from many users
- How long do you store a cached response?
 - Original server tells you: TTL entry
 - Server deletes entry after TTL expires



Negative Caching

- Remember things that don't work
 - Misspellings like www.cnn.comm, ww.cnn.com
- These can take a long time to fail the first time
 - Good to cache negative results so it will fail faster next time
- But negative caching is optional, and not widely implemented



DNS Protocol

- TCP/UDP port 53
- Most traffic uses UDP
 - Lightweight protocol has 512 byte message limit
 - Retry using TCP if UDP fails (e.g., reply truncated)
- TCP requires messages boundaries
 - Prefix all messages with 16-bit length
- Bit in query determines if query is recursive



Resource Records

- All DNS info represented as resource records (RR)
 name [ttl] [class] type rdata
 - name: domain name
 - TTL: time to live in seconds
 - class: for extensibility, normally IN (1) "Internet"
 - type: type of the record
 - rdata: resource data dependent on the type

• Two important RR types

- A Internet Address (IPv4)
- NS name server

• Example RRs

www.cs.brown.edu. 86400 IN A 128.148.32.110
cs.brown.edu. 86400 IN NS dns.cs.brown.edu.
cs.brown.edu. 86400 IN NS ns1.ucsb.edu.



Some important details

- How do local servers find root servers?
 - DNS lookup on a.root-servers.net ?
 - Servers configured with *root cache* file
 - Contains root name servers and their addresses

	3600000	ΙN	NS	A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.	3600000		А	198.41.0.4

- How do you get addresses of other name servers?
 - To obtain the address of www.cs.brown.edu, ask a.eduservers.net, says a.root-servers.net
 - How do you find a.edu-servers.net?
 - Glue records: A records in parent zone



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Example


dig +norec www.cs.brown.edu @a.root-servers.net

dig +norec www.cs.brown.edu @a.edu-servers.net

dig +norec www.cs.brown.edu @bru-ns1.brown.edu


www.cs.brown.edu. 86400 IN A 128.148.32.110






• Same format for queries and replies

- Query has 0 RRs in Answer/Authority/Additional
- Reply includes question, plus has RRs
- Authority allows for delegation







- Id: match response to query; QR: 0 query/1 response
- RCODE: error code.

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- AA: authoritative answer, TC: truncated,
- RD: recursion desired, RA: recursion available

Other RR Types

- CNAME (canonical name): specifies an alias www.google.com. 446199 IN CNAME www.l.google.com. www.l.google.com. 300 IN A 72.14.204.147
- MX record: specifies servers to handle mail for a domain (the part after the @ in email addr)
 - Different for historical reasons
- SOA (start of authority)
 - Information about a DNS zone and the server responsible for the zone
- PTR (reverse lookup)

7.34.148.128.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN PTR quanto.cs.brown.edu.



Reliability

- Answers may contain several alternate servers
- Try alternate servers on timeout
 - Exponential backoff when retrying same server
- Use same identifier for all queries
 - Don't care which server responds



Inserting a Record in DNS

- Your new startup helpme.com
- Get a block of addresses from ISP
 - Say 212.44.9.128/25

• Register helpme.com at GoDaddy.com (for ex.)

- Provide name and address of your authoritative name server (primary and secondary)
- Registrar inserts RR pair into the com TLD server:
 - helpme.com NS dns1.helpme.com
 - dns1.helpme.com A 212.44.9.129
- Configure your authoritative server (dns1.helpme.com)
 - Type A record for www.helpme.com
 - Type MX record for foobar.com



Inserting a Record in DNS, cont

Need to provide reverse PTR bindings

- E.g., 212.44.9.129 -> dns1.helpme.com

- Normally, these would go into the 9.44.212.inaddr.arpa zone
- Problem: you can't run the name server for that domain. Why not?
 - Your block is 212.44.9.128/25, not 212.44.9.0/24
 - Whoever has 212.44.9.0/25 wouldn't be happy with you setting their PTR records
- Solution: [RFC2317, Classless Delegation]
- Install CNAME records in parent zone, e.g.
 - 129.9.44.212.in-addr.arpa CNAME 129.ptr.helpme.com

DNS Measurements (Data from MIT, 2000)

- What is being looked up?
 - 60% A, 25% PTR, 5% MX, 6% ANY
- Latency
 - Median ~100ms (90th percentile ~500ms)
- Query packets per lookup: ~2.4
- Top 10% of domains \rightarrow ~70% of lookups
 - Great for caching!
- 9% of lookups are unique
 - Caching can't hit more than 91%
- Cache hit rates actually ~75%



DNS Measurements (Data from MIT, 2000)

• Does DNS give back answers?

- ~23% of queries do not elicit an answer
- ~13% return NXDOMAIN (or similar)
 - Mostly reverse lookups
- Only ~64% of queries are successful

• ~63% of DNS packets in unanswered queries

- Failing queries are frequently retransmitted
- 99.9% successful queries have <= 2 retransmissions</p>



DNS Security

- You go to starbucks, how does your browser find www.google.com?
 - Ask local name server, obtained from DHCP
 - You implicitly trust this server
 - Can return any answer for google.com, including a malicious IP that poses as a man in the middle
- How can you know you are getting correct data?
 - Today, you can't
 - HTTPS can help
 - DNSSEC extension will allow you to verify



DNS Security 2 – Cache Poisoning

• Suppose you control evil.com. You receive a query for www.evil.com and reply:

;; QUESTION SECTION: ;www.evil.com.		IN	A	
;; ANSWER SECTION: www.evil.com.	300	IN	A	212.44.9.144
;; AUTHORITY SECTION: evil.com. evil.com.	600 600	IN IN	NS NS	dns1.evil.com. <mark>google.com</mark> .
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION google.com.	l: 5	IN	A	212.44.9.155

• Glue record pointing to your IP, not Google's



• Gets cached!

Cache Poisoning # 2

- But how do you get a victim to look up evil.com?
- You might connect to their mail server and send
 - HELO www.evil.com
 - Which their mail server then looks up to see if it corresponds to your IP address (SPAM filtering)
- Mitigation (bailiwick checking)
 - Only accept glue records from the domain you asked for



Cache Poisoning

- Another possibility: bad guy at Starbucks, can sniff or guess the ID field the local server will use
 - Not hard if DNS server generates ID numbers sequentially
 - Can be done if you force the DNS server to look up something in *your* name server
 - Guessing has 1 in 65535 chance (Or does it?)
- Now:
 - Ask the local server to lookup google.com
 - Spoof the response from google.com using the correct ID
 - Bogus response arrives before legit one (maybe)
- Local server caches first response it receives
 - Attacker can set a long TTL



Kaminsky Exploit

- If good guy wins the race, you have to wait until the TTL to race again
- But...
 - What if you start a new race, for AAAA.google.com, AAAB.google.com, ...?
 - Forge CNAME responses for each
 - Circumvents bailiwick checking



Countermeasures

Randomize id

- Used to be sequential

• Randomize source port number

- Used to be the same for all requests from the server
- Offers some protection, but attack still possible



Solution: signatures

- Signature: cryptographic way to prove a party is who they say they are
- Requires a chain of trust
- DNSSEC deployment is underway



Some more DNS fun

- You can use DNS to tunnel data!
- Steps:
 - Start up a Name Server for a domain you control
 - Send info encoding data in the domain name part of a query
 - Server encodes response in a TXT record
- Why? DNS is often *not* blocked in airports, etc
- This has been a final project in this class!

