CSCI-1680 Network Layer: Inter-domain Routing – Policy and Security

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Based partly on lecture notes by Jennifer Rexford, Rob Sherwood, David Mazières, Phil Levis, John Jannotti

Today

• BGP Continued

- Policy routing, instability, vulnerabilities



Route Selection

- More specific prefix
- Next-hop reachable?
- Prefer highest weight
 - Computed using some AS-specific local policy
- Prefer highest local-pref
- Prefer locally originated routes
- Prefer routes with shortest AS path length
- Prefer eBGP over iBGP
- Prefer routes with lowest cost to egress point
 - Hot-potato routing
- Tie-breaking rules
 - E.g., oldest route, lowest router-id



Customer/Provider AS relationships

- Customer pays for connectivity
 - E.g. Brown contracts with OSHEAN
 - Customer is stub, provider is a transit
- Many customers are multi-homed
 - E.g., OSHEAN connects to Level3, Cogent
- Typical policies:
 - Provider tells all neighbors how to reach customer
 - Provider prefers routes from customers (\$\$)
 - Customer does not provide transit service




Peer Relationships

- ASs agree to exchange traffic for free
 - Penalties/Renegotiate if imbalance
- Tier 1 ISPs have no default route: all peer with each other
- You are Tier *i* + 1 if you have a default route to a Tier *I*
- Typical policies
 - AS only exports customer routes to peer
 - AS exports a peer's routes only to its customers
 - Goal: avoid being transit when no gain



AS Relationships



- How to prevent X from forwarding transit between B and C?
- How to avoid transit between CBA ?
 - B: BAZ -> X



– B: BAZ -> C ? (=> Y: CBAZ and Y:CAZ)

Gao-Rexford Model

- (simplified) Two types of relationships: peers and customer/provider
- Export rules:
 - Customer route may be exported to all neighbors
 - Peer or provider route is only exported to customers
- Preference rules:
 - Prefer routes through customer (\$\$)
- If all ASes follow this, shown to lead to stable network



Peering Drama

- Cogent vs. Level3 were peers
- In 2003, Level3 decided to start charging Cogent
- Cogent said no
- Internet partition: Cogent's customers couldn't get to Level3's customers and vice-versa

Other ISPs were affected as well


• Took 3 weeks to reach an undisclosed agreement



"Shutting off" the Internet

 Starting from Jan 27th, 2011, Egypt was disconnected from the Internet


- 2769/2903 networks withdrawn from BGP (95%)!





Source: RIPEStat - http://stat.ripe.net/egypt/

Egypt Incident





Source: BGPMon (http://bgpmon.net/blog/?p=480)

Some BGP Challenges

- Convergence
- Traffic engineering
 - How to assure certain routes are selected
- Scaling (route reflectors)
- Security




Convergence

- Given a change, how long until the network restabilizes?
 - Depends on change: sometimes never
 - Open research problem: "tweak and pray"
 - Distributed setting is challenging
- Some reasons for change
 - Topology changes
 - BGP session failures
 - Changes in policy
 - Conflicts between policies can cause oscillation



Routing Change: Before and After



Routing Change: Path Exploration

• AS 1

- Delete the route (1,0)
- Switch to next route (1,2,0)
- Send route (1,2,0) to AS 3
- AS 3
 - Sees (1,2,0) replace (1,0)
 - Compares to route (2,0)
 - Switches to using AS 2

0	
E A	(2,0)
$1 \xrightarrow{(1,2,0)}$	2
	(3,2,0)
3	




Routing Change: Path Exploration

- Initial situation
 - Destination 0 is alive
 - All ASes use direct path
- When destination dies
 - All ASes lose direct path
 - All switch to longer paths
 - Eventually withdrawn
- E.g., AS 2
 - (2,0) → (2,1,0)
 - (2,1,0) → (2,3,0)
 - (2,3,0) → (2,1,3,0)
 - − (2,1,3,0) → null



Convergence may be slow!




Route Engineering

- Route filtering
- Setting weights
- More specific routes: longest prefix
- AS prepending: "477 477 477 477"
- More of an art than science



Unstable Configurations

• Due to policy conflicts (Dispute Wheel)





Avoiding BGP Instabilities

• Detecting conflicting policies


- Centralized: NP-Complete problem!
- Distributed: open research problem
- Requires too much cooperation
- Detecting oscillations
 - Monitoring for repetitive BGP messages
- Restricted routing policies and topologies
 - Some topologies / policies proven to be safe*



* Gao & Rexford, "Stable Internet Routing without Global Coordination", IEEE/ACM ToN, 2001


Scaling iBGP: route reflectors

BGP Mesh == O(n^2) mess





Scaling iBGP: route reflectors





BGP Security Goals


- Confidential message exchange between neighbors
- Validity of routing information
 - Origin, Path, Policy
- Correspondence to the data path



Origin: IP Address Ownership and Hijacking

- IP address block assignment
 - Regional Internet Registries (ARIN, RIPE, APNIC)
 - Internet Service Providers
- Proper origination of a prefix into BGP
 - By the AS who owns the prefix
 - ... or, by its upstream provider(s) in its behalf
- However, what's to stop someone else?
 - Prefix hijacking: another AS originates the prefix
 - BGP does not verify that the AS is authorized
 - Registries of prefix ownership are inaccurate






- Consequences for the affected ASes
 - Blackhole: data traffic is discarded
 - Snooping: data traffic is inspected, and then redirected
 - Impersonation: data traffic is sent to bogus destinations

Hijacking is Hard to Debug

- Real origin AS doesn't see the problem
 - Picks its own route
 - Might not even learn the bogus route
- May not cause loss of connectivity
 - E.g., if the bogus AS snoops and redirects
 - ... may only cause performance degradation
- Or, loss of connectivity is isolated
 - E.g., only for sources in parts of the Internet
- Diagnosing prefix hijacking
 - Analyzing updates from many vantage points
 - Launching traceroute from many vantage points



Sub-Prefix Hijacking



• Originating a more-specific prefix

- Every AS picks the bogus route for that prefix
- Traffic follows the longest matching prefix



How to Hijack a Prefix

• The hijacking AS has

- Router with eBGP session(s)
- Configured to originate the prefix
- Getting access to the router
 - Network operator makes configuration mistake
 - Disgruntled operator launches an attack
 - Outsider breaks in to the router and reconfigures
- Getting other ASes to believe bogus route
 - Neighbor ASes not filtering the routes
 - ... e.g., by allowing only expected prefixes
 - But, specifying filters on *peering* links is hard



Pakistan Youtube incident

- Youtube's has prefix 208.65.152.0/22
- Pakistan's government order Youtube blocked
- Pakistan Telecom (AS 17557) announces 208.65.153.0/24 in the wrong direction (outwards!)
- Longest prefix match caused worldwide outage
- <u>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IzLPKuAOe50</u>



Many other incidents

- Spammers steal unused IP space to hide
 - Announce very short prefixes (e.g., /8). Why?
 - For a short amount of time
- China incident, April 8th 2010
 - China Telecom's AS23724 generally announces 40 prefixes
 - On April 8th, announced ~37,000 prefixes
 - About 10% leaked outside of China
 - Suddenly, going to <u>www.dell.com</u> might have you routing through AS23724!



Attacks on BGP Paths

- Remove an AS from the path
 - E.g., 701 3715 88 -> 701 88
- Why?
 - Attract sources that would normally avoid AS 3715
 - Make path through you look more attractive
 - Make AS 88 look like it is closer to the core
 - Can fool loop detection!
- May be hard to tell whether this is a lie
 - 88 could indeed connect directly to 701!




Attacks on BGP Paths

- Adding ASes to the path
 - E.g., 701 88 -> 701 3715 88
- Why?
 - Trigger loop detection in AS 3715
 - This would block unwanted traffic from AS 3715!
 - Make your AS look more connected
- Who can tell this is a lie?
 - AS 3715 could, if it could see the route
 - AS 88 could, but would it really care?



Attacks on BGP Paths

- Adding ASes at the end of the path
 - E.g., 701 88 into 701 88 3
- Why?
 - Evade detection for a bogus route (if added AS is legitimate owner of a prefix)
- Hard to tell that the path is bogus!





Proposed Solution: S-BGP

- Based on a public key infrastructure
- Address attestations
 - Claims the right to originate a prefix
 - Signed and distributed out of band
 - Checked through delegation chain from ICANN

Route attestations

- Attribute in BGP update message
- Signed by each AS as route along path
- S-BGP can avoid
 - Prefix hijacking
 - Addition, removal, or reordering of intermediate ASes



S-BGP Deployment

• Very challenging

- PKI (RPKI)
- Accurate address registries
- Need to perform cryptographic operations on all path operations
- Flag day almost impossible
- Incremental deployment offers little incentive
- But there is hope! [Goldberg et al, 2011]
 - Road to incremental deployment
 - Change rules to break ties for secure paths
 - If a few top Tier-1 ISPs
 - Plus their respective stub clients deploy simplified version (just sign, not validate)
 - Gains in traffic => \$ => adoption!



Data Plane Attacks

- Routers/ASes can advertise one route, but not necessarily follow it!
- May drop packets
 - Or a fraction of packets
 - What if you just slow down some traffic?
- Can send packets in a different direction
 - Impersonation attack
 - Snooping attack
- How to detect?
 - Congestion or an attack?
 - Can let ping/traceroute packets go through
 - End-to-end checks?
- Harder to pull off, as you need control of a router



BGP Recap

- Key protocol that holds Internet routing together
- Path Vector Protocol among Autonomous Systems
- Policy, feasibility first; non-optimal routes
- Important security problems



Next Class

• Network layer wrap up



Following slides not covered, but interesting




Multiple Stable Configurations BGP Wedgies [RFC 4264]

• Typical policy:

- Prefer routes from customers
- Then prefer shortest paths




BGP Wedgies





BGP Wedgies





BGP Wedgies

