CSCI-1680
Network Layer:
Inter-domain Routing – Policy and Security

Rodrigo Fonseca
Homework 2 is out
Rodrigo’s office hours:
  – Monday 1-3 (or by appointment)
Today

- BGP Continued
  - Policy routing, instability, vulnerabilities
Route Selection

- **More specific prefix**
- Next-hop reachable?
- Prefer highest weight
  - Computed using some AS-specific local policy
- Prefer highest local-pref
- Prefer locally originated routes
- Prefer routes with shortest AS path length
- Prefer eBGP over iBGP
- Prefer routes with lowest cost to egress point
  - Hot-potato routing
- **Tie-breaking rules**
  - E.g., oldest route, lowest router-id
Customer/Provider AS relationships

• **Customer pays for connectivity**
  – E.g. Brown contracts with OSHEAN
  – Customer is stub, provider is a transit

• **Many customers are multi-homed**
  – E.g., OSHEAN connects to Level3, Cogent

• **Typical policies:**
  – Provider tells all neighbors how to reach customer
  – Provider prefers routes from customers ($$)
  – Customer does not provide transit service
Peer Relationships

• ASs agree to exchange traffic for free
  – Penalties/Renegotiate if imbalance

• Tier 1 ISPs have no default route: all peer with each other

• You are Tier $i + 1$ if you have a default route to a Tier $I$

• Typical policies
  – AS only exports customer routes to peer
  – AS exports a peer’s routes only to its customers
  – Goal: avoid being transit when no gain
Peering Drama

- Cogent vs. Level3 were peers
- In 2003, Level3 decided to start charging Cogent
- Cogent said no
- **Internet partition**: Cogent’s customers couldn’t get to Level3’s customers and vice-versa
  - Other ISPs were affected as well
- Took 3 weeks to reach an undisclosed agreement
“Shutting off” the Internet

- Starting from Jan 27th, 2011, Egypt was disconnected from the Internet
  - 2769/2903 networks withdrawn from BGP (95%)!

Source: RIPEStat - http://stat.ripe.net/egypt/
Egypt Incident

Number of Egyptian networks

Source: BGPMon (http://bgpmon.net/blog/?p=480)
Some BGP Challenges

- Convergence
- Traffic engineering
  - How to assure certain routes are selected
- Scaling (route reflectors)
- Security
Convergence

• Given a change, how long until the network re-stabilizes?
  – Depends on change: sometimes never
  – Open research problem: “tweak and pray”
  – Distributed setting is challenging

• Some reasons for change
  – Topology changes
  – BGP session failures
  – Changes in policy
  – Conflicts between policies can cause oscillation
Routing Change: Before and After

Before:

0 \rightarrow (1,0) \rightarrow 1 \rightarrow (3,1,0) \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow (1,2,0) \rightarrow 2

0 \rightarrow (2,0) \rightarrow 2

After:

0 \rightarrow (2,0) \rightarrow 2

1 \rightarrow (1,2,0) \rightarrow 2

3 \rightarrow (3,2,0)
Routing Change: Path Exploration

- **AS 1**
  - Delete the route (1,0)
  - Switch to next route (1,2,0)
  - Send route (1,2,0) to AS 3

- **AS 3**
  - Sees (1,2,0) replace (1,0)
  - Compares to route (2,0)
  - Switches to using AS 2
Routing Change: Path Exploration

- **Initial situation**
  - Destination 0 is alive
  - All ASes use direct path

- **When destination dies**
  - All ASes lose direct path
  - All switch to longer paths
  - Eventually withdrawn

- **E.g., AS 2**
  - $(2,0) \rightarrow (2,1,0)$
  - $(2,1,0) \rightarrow (2,3,0)$
  - $(2,3,0) \rightarrow (2,1,3,0)$
  - $(2,1,3,0) \rightarrow \text{null}$

- **Convergence may be slow!**
Route Engineering

- Route filtering
- Setting weights
- More specific routes: longest prefix
- AS prepending: “477 477 477 477”
- More of an art than science
Multiple Stable Configurations
BGP Wedgies [RFC 4264]

• Typical policy:
  – Prefer routes from customers
  – Then prefer shortest paths
BGP Wedgies

1.2.0.0/16: 1 1 1 1 (Backup Path)

1.2.0.0/16: 1 Primary Path
BGP Wedgies

1.2.0.0/16: 1 1 1 1
(Backup Path)

1.2.0.0/16: 1
Primary Path

3 2 1 1 1 1

4 3 2 1 1 1 1

2 1 1 1 1

5 4 3 2 1 1 1 1
BGP Wedgies

3 prefers customer route: stable configuration!
Unstable Configurations

- Due to policy conflicts (Dispute Wheel)
Avoiding BGP Instabilities

• Detecting conflicting policies
  – Centralized: NP-Complete problem!
  – Distributed: open research problem
  – Requires too much cooperation

• Detecting oscillations
  – Monitoring for repetitive BGP messages

• Restricted routing policies and topologies
  – Some topologies / policies proven to be safe*

* Gao & Rexford, “Stable Internet Routing without Global Coordination”, IEEE/ACM ToN, 2001
Scaling iBGP: route reflectors

iBGP Mesh == O(n^2) mess
Scaling iBGP: route reflectors

Solution: Route Reflectors
O(n*k)
BGP Security Goals

• Confidential message exchange between neighbors
• Validity of routing information
  – Origin, Path, Policy
• Correspondence to the data path
Origin: IP Address Ownership and Hijacking

• IP address block assignment
  – Regional Internet Registries (ARIN, RIPE, APNIC)
  – Internet Service Providers

• Proper origination of a prefix into BGP
  – By the AS who owns the prefix
  – … or, by its upstream provider(s) in its behalf

• However, what’s to stop someone else?
  – Prefix hijacking: another AS originates the prefix
  – BGP does not verify that the AS is authorized
  – Registries of prefix ownership are inaccurate
Prefix Hijacking

• Consequences for the affected ASes
  – Blackhole: data traffic is discarded
  – Snooping: data traffic is inspected, and then redirected
  – Impersonation: data traffic is sent to bogus destinations
Hijacking is Hard to Debug

• Real origin AS doesn’t see the problem
  – Picks its own route
  – Might not even learn the bogus route
• May not cause loss of connectivity
  – E.g., if the bogus AS snoops and redirects
  – … may only cause performance degradation
• Or, loss of connectivity is isolated
  – E.g., only for sources in parts of the Internet
• Diagnosing prefix hijacking
  – Analyzing updates from many vantage points
  – Launching traceroute from many vantage points
Sub-Prefix Hijacking

• Originating a more-specific prefix
  – Every AS picks the bogus route for that prefix
  – Traffic follows the longest matching prefix
How to Hijack a Prefix

• The hijacking AS has
  – Router with eBGP session(s)
  – Configured to originate the prefix

• Getting access to the router
  – Network operator makes configuration mistake
  – Disgruntled operator launches an attack
  – Outsider breaks in to the router and reconfigures

• Getting other ASes to believe bogus route
  – Neighbor ASes not filtering the routes
  – … e.g., by allowing only expected prefixes
  – But, specifying filters on *peering* links is hard
Pakistan Youtube incident

• Youtube’s has prefix 208.65.152.0/22
• Pakistan’s government order Youtube blocked
• Pakistan Telecom (AS 17557) announces 208.65.153.0/24 in the wrong direction (outwards!)
• Longest prefix match caused worldwide outage
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IzLPKuAOe50
Many other incidents

• Spammers steal unused IP space to hide
  – Announce very short prefixes (e.g., /8). Why?
  – For a short amount of time

• China incident, April 8th 2010
  – China Telecom’s AS23724 generally announces 40 prefixes
  – On April 8th, announced ~37,000 prefixes
  – About 10% leaked outside of China
  – Suddenly, going to www.dell.com might have you routing through AS23724!
Attacks on BGP Paths

• **Remove an AS from the path**
  - E.g., 701 3715 88 -> 701 88

• **Why?**
  - Attract sources that would normally avoid AS 3715
  - Make AS 88 look like it is closer to the core
  - Can fool loop detection!

• **May be hard to tell whether this is a lie**
  - 88 could indeed connect directly to 701!
Attacks on BGP Paths

• Adding ASes to the path
  – E.g., 701 88 -> 701 3715 88

• Why?
  – Trigger loop detection in AS 3715
    • This would block unwanted traffic from AS 3715!
  – Make your AS look more connected

• Who can tell this is a lie?
  – AS 3715 could, if it could see the route
  – AS 88 could, but would it really care?
Attacks on BGP Paths

- Adding ASes at the end of the path
  - E.g., 701 88 into 701 88 3

- Why?
  - Evade detection for a bogus route (if added AS is legitimate owner of a prefix)

- Hard to tell that the path is bogus!
Proposed Solution: S-BGP

• Based on a public key infrastructure
• **Address attestations**
  – Claims the right to originate a prefix
  – Signed and distributed out of band
  – Checked through delegation chain from ICANN
• **Route attestations**
  – Attribute in BGP update message
  – Signed by each AS as route along path
• **S-BGP can avoid**
  – Prefix hijacking
  – Addition, removal, or reordering of intermediate ASes
S-BGP Deployment

• Very challenging
  – PKI
  – Accurate address registries
  – Need to perform cryptographic operations on all path operations
  – Flag day almost impossible
  – Incremental deployment offers little incentive

• But there is hope! [Goldberg et al, 2011]
  – Road to incremental deployment
  – Change rules to break ties for secure paths
  – If a few top Tier-1 ISPs
  – Plus their respective stub clients deploy simplified version (just sign, not validate)
  – Gains in traffic => $ => adoption!
Data Plane Attacks

• Routers/ASes can advertise one route, but not necessarily follow it!

• May drop packets
  – Or a fraction of packets
  – What if you just slow down some traffic?

• Can send packets in a different direction
  – Impersonation attack
  – Snooping attack

• How to detect?
  – Congestion or an attack?
  – Can let ping/traceroute packets go through
  – End-to-end checks?

• Harder to pull off, as you need control of a router
BGP Recap

• Key protocol that holds Internet routing together
• Path Vector Protocol among Autonomous Systems
• Policy, feasibility first; non-optimal routes
• Important security problems
Next Class

• Network layer wrap up